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I. INTRODUCTION
Even the most enthusiastic commentators on Gorbachev's at-
tempts to restructure the Soviet economy admit that the system does
not show many symptoms of a quick economic recovery.
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika are tested in an atmosphere that
resembles the Sisyphean Labors rather than the noisy hurrah-enthusi-
asm of the Khrushchev era. Until recently, only an internal reform of
the Soviet Communist Party and a heralded shift of power from the
political to the legislative and executive bodies were perceived in the
West as significant evidence of a structural transformation within the
Soviet Constitutional System. The assessment of these constitutional
changes, however, requires a careful study of the Soviet post-revolu-
tion constitutional development and an examination of the question
whether they constitute true reform, or only a deception conceived to
divert attention from internal distresses of the system.
At this moment, it is also quite apparent that constitutional
transformation in Eastern Europe is imminent as the Eastern Euro-
pean leadership continues to change. Now is the most appropriate
time to consider what, if anything, the future constitutional model
will be. Obviously, it will not continue to be the Soviet model. Will it
be, however, based to any extent on American, British, East or West
European liberal traditions? Will it be an amalgam of any, or all, of
these? These questions have not yet received adequate attention.
Experts studying the process of political transformation observe
that the successful transfer of power or the emergence of new centers
of political responsibility requires a vast knowledge of the social, eco-
nomic, cultural and geopolitical circumstances in which the new insti-
tutions are to be installed. Successful constitutional or legal
engineering also requires advanced comparative technique to help lo-
cate political devices applicable to unique combinations of local fac-
tors. The success of the constitutional works is largely attributable to
the mature intellectual background of the constitutional drafters, and
to their ability to draw from the experience of other nations. It re-
quires appropriate channels of information which can facilitate the
exchange of political ideas.
The dissemination of the constitutional experience currently
makes possible the quick adoption of well-tested constitutional princi-
ples. One may argue that the time factor has become less important
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with the growth of a world-wide constitutional experience. In the
conditions of significant political isolation, however, the development
of constitutional movements requires more time than in conditions
conducive to the transfer of constitutional experience.
For years, free access to constitutional experience was blocked
for the socialist countries. Because of the lack of significant interflow
of opinions between the West and East and because of Soviet control,
the societies of Eastern Europe had either to adopt blindly the Soviet
constitutional model or to try to draw from their own constitutional
traditions. Today, the East Europeans face an exciting and challeng-
ing prospect of developing a new constitutional model. With discus-
sion of new laws many questions naturally arise. It is necessary to
evaluate the legacy of socialist constitutional structures and to deter-
mine the applicability of the Western models and the East European
constitutional traditions and experiences. This may need insight into
both the inner dynamics of the East-Central European political arena
and the Western perspective.
The purpose of this Article is to review the constitutional tradi-
tions of the East-Central European states with emphasis on their lib-
eral and democratic attributes. The Article will also examine the
common core of the socialist constitutions and analyze the current
constitutional development in the Soviet Union and in the two Cen-
tral European countries most advanced in the process of constitu-
tional transformation, Poland and Hungary. Finally, it will supply
observations on the process of forming a new constitutional model in
East-Central Europe.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS: THE OVERVIEW
A. Polish Constitutional Traditions
The constitutional history of a country begins when some institu-
tions have been established and when procedures have been imple-
mented to limit the power of the government. "Constitutions," wrote
Kenneth C. Wheare, "spring from belief in limited Government."' In
trying to trace the origins of the Polish constitutional government,
one finds that the process of limiting the king's power began in Poland
as early as the fourteenth century, and that Poland emerged as a con-
stitutional monarchy in a period when other major European coun-
tries were reinforcing their absolutism.2 At the end of the sixteenth
1. K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1951).
2. See WAGNER, COLEMAN & HAIGHT, Laurentius Grimaldus Goslicius and his Age -
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century, Poland with its system of so-called "democracy of the gen-
try" looked like an island surrounded by monarchies which vested the
combined legislative, executive and judicial power in one ruler. This
system contributed to the internal crisis of the Polish Commonwealth
which coincided with successful internal reforms in Russia, Prussia
and Austria. The neighbors were interested in keeping Poland demili-
tarized, neutralized and in a state of anarchy. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, a faction of politically mature nobles was formed. This faction
was quite aware of the deficiencies within the Polish political system
and despite internal opposition prepared sound programs of reforms.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the nobles' activity resulted in
the adoption of the first written constitution in Europe which substan-
tially reformed the Polish political structure.
3
1. The Constitution of May 3, 1791
The Polish Constitution of 1791 began with the words, "In the
name of God, the one and only in the Holy Trinity." It drew the
distinction between Roman Catholicism and "other creeds," and
stated that the deviation from Catholicism was recognized as apos-
tasy. It confirmed, however, that "the religious freedom, and protec-
tion of the government for other (than Roman Catholic) religions is
guaranteed.'4
The critics often tried to expose the non-democratic character of
the Polish Constitution of 1791 and claimed that it was adopted by
the nobility, served the interests of this single class, and did not solve
the crucial social problems of the time. 5 In fact, the constitution did
not undermine the monopoly of the nobility's political power, but in-
troduced the burghers into the political arena and gave peasants bet-
ter protection of law. The recent bicentennial comparative studies of
the American and Polish first constitutions demonstrate that the
traditional attempt to set the democratic American Constitution
against the non-democratic Polish Act is not justified, and the com-
parison of the political rights addressed in both constitutions demon-
strates much more impressive similarities than are usually admitted. 6
Modern Constitutional Law Ideas in the Sixteenth Century, in POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT
THE AGES 98 (W. Wagner ed. 1970).
3. For a more profound examination of the Polish constitutional traditions see
Ludwikowski, Two Firsts: A Comparative Study of the American and the Polish Constitutions,
8 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 117-56 (1987) [hereinafter Two Firsts].
4. NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND (1791) (English trans.).
5. See A. AJNENKIEL, POLSKIE KONSTYTUCJE (Polish Constitutions) 21-22 (1983) [here-
inafter AJNENKIEL].
6. See Two Firsts, supra note 3, at 145-46.
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The critics of the first Polish Constitution argued frequently that
despite the declaration that the highest authority was vested in the
three powers, the whole concept of the distribution, separation and
balances of the main branches of government was not accomplished.
The Law on Government, as the Constitution of May 3 was officially
called, and a few detailed statutes departed from the original concept
of "checks and balances" and granted far superior power to the Seym.
The Seym held the legislative power. It was composed of two
chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Although the
king presided over the Senate, the national sovereignty was vested in
the Chamber of Deputies which was declared "to be a temple of legis-
lature."'7 All bills were introduced to the lower chamber and later
sent to the Senate for further debate. The king did not have the right
to veto the decisions of the lower chamber. This right was vested in
the Senate, and the Senate's veto could be overruled by the Chamber
of Deputies in the second ballot at the subsequent session. The legis-
lative initiative was vested in the king, the Council of Guardians, the
deputies, and in the local diets. The local diets retained the legislative
initiative, but could no longer vote on local taxes, and their instruc-
tions were not binding on the deputies to the Seym, who were recog-
nized as the representatives of the whole nation. In this way, the
whole legislative power was centralized in the Seym. The constitu-
tionality of its decisions was not subject to any control. As Boguslaw
Lesnodorski wrote, "In short, we do not have here [in the concept of
the reformed government] the idea of the strict division of powers.
There is no balance. There are good foundations for the symocracy of
the nobility." 8
The constitution introduced a system which featured some of the
attributes of the parliamentary form of government. The legislature
was recognized as a supreme power. The king, as head of the state,
appointed the ministers for two years, but the nominations were to be
presented to both Chambers of the Seym which could vote "no confi-
dence" on the king's nominees. Also, a two-thirds majority of the
joint Chambers could dismiss a minister during his two-year tenure.
The constitution did not provide, however, for any procedure which
could dismiss the whole government. The king, as a chief executive
officer, was no longer elected. After the death of Stanislas Augustus,
the Polish throne was to become hereditary in the House of the Elec-
7. NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND (1791), at art. VI.
8. B. LESNODORSKI, DZIELO SEJMU CZEROLETNIEGO 1788-1792 (The Work of the
Four-Year Long Seym 1788-1792) 294 (1951).
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tor of Saxony.9 The king was not responsible for the parliament, but
his decisions (as in the British government) could be exercised
through, and on, the advice of ministers who were expected to coun-
tersign them.
The constitution provided that the executive power would be
vested in the king and the Guardians of Law. The Guardians did not
constitute a formal cabinet. They were to perform the role of the
king's Council. In this Council, the "king's voice was to prevail."
The king, similar to the President in the American system, assumed
two roles: the head of state and head of government.
The Law on Government played a very special role in the Polish
constitutional history. Under Russian pressure, the constitution was
abolished by the rebel Confederation in 1792 and was followed by the
second partition of Poland of January 23, 1793. The basic principles
of the government as advanced by the framers of the constitution,
however, remained very much alive in Polish political thought. The
Polish Governmental Law was not only the first European written
constitution, but, for generations of Poles, it became a symbol of a
mature political culture. It left an important legacy which was fol-
lowed by the Polish constitution in the twentieth century.
2. Polish Constitutions in the Period of the Partitions
The Polish constitutions of the nineteenth century were granted
by.the foreign monarchies and displayed few similarities to the Con-
stitution of 1791. They also exerted less influence on the development
of current Polish constitutional thought and, as such, do not require
more extensive analysis in this study.
In 1794, Poland once again tried to end Russian tutelage. A na-
tional insurrection led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a hero in the Ameri-
can Revolutionary War, was not successful. The Kosciuszko
Insurrection was followed by the abdication of King Stanislas Augus-
tus Poniatowski (November 24, 1795) and the third partition of Po-
land, which eliminated the Polish State. Most of the Polish territories
were incorporated into Austria, Prussia or Russia.
The next constitution was granted to the Poles by Napoleon. In
July of 1807, Napoleon established a small, independent buffer state
carved out of the Prussian segment of Poland. Napoleon summoned
the representatives of the Polish Governing Committee to Drezden




and dictated a compact constitution.1o It consisted of eighty-nine
short articles and was deprived of the patriotic phraseology of the
Constitution of 1791. It confirmed the status of Catholicism as "a
State religion," but it emphasized that "all religious worship is free
and public."" The proclamation of the Constitution of 1791, which
stated, "the deviation from Catholicism was recognized as apostasy,"
was deliberately dropped. The Constitution of 1807 vested strong ex-
ecutive power in the King of Saxonia, who was to be hereditary ruler
of the Duchy of Warsaw. The legislative power of the Seym was lim-
ited to taxation, civil and criminal law. The Council of Guardians
from the Constitution of 1791 was replaced by the French model of
the Council of State. The Council, composed of ministers, was given
vast powers to work on bills which were to be submitted to the Seym.
It operated as an administrative court and a court of cassation. In
regard to the social sphere, the Constitution of 1807 "abolished slav-
ery" and stated that "all citizens are equal in law." Generally, the
constitution was fashioned on the French pattern, and incorporated
only a few Polish institutions. The Constitution of the Duchy of War-
saw served as a model for the Constitution of Westphalia and a few
constitutions of the member states of the Union of the Rhineland.12
The fall of Napoleon ended the short life of the Duchy of War-
saw. Early in 1813, the Russian army again entered Polish territory.
After the Vienna Congress of 1815, the western part of the Duchy of
Warsaw, named the Grand Duchy of Poznan, was incorporated into
Prussia. A tiny autonomous state, the Republic of Cracow, was
formed from the district of Cracow. Out of the remainder of the for-
mer Duchy of Warsaw, Russia created the Kingdom of Poland. In
November of 1815, the new state was granted a constitution. The text
was drafted by the Polish aristocrat, Adam Czartoryski and was ed-
ited considerably by Tsar Alexander the First.13 The king, acting si-
multaneously as the Russian Tsar, reserved for himself the legislative
initiative and the right to veto the Seym's statutes. Both chambers
were allowed to discuss the government's reports and legislative
projects. The Chamber of Deputies could question the ministers and
submit complaints about governmental officials to the Senate. The
meetings of the Seym were to be open to the press, an arrangement
10. See A. GIEYSZTOR, S. KIENIEWICZ, E. ROSTWOROWSKI, J. TAZBIR & H. WER-
ESZYCKI, HISTORY OF POLAND 413 (1968) [hereinafter GIEYSZTOR].
11. See THE CONSTITUTION OF 1807, reprinted in M. HANDELSMAN, TRZY KON-
STYTUCJE (The Three Constitutions) 1-12 (1915).
12. See AJNENKIEL, supra note 5, at 91.
13. See GIEYSZTOR, supra note 10, at 433.
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which was to guarantee public control over the lawfulness of govern-
mental actions.
The constitution was quickly recognized as the most liberal con-
stitution in Europe. In numerous pamphlets, Polish commentators
glorified the "Magnanimous Tsar" and emphasized his "unlimited
generosity" and truly liberal convictions.' 4 Common optimism as to
the glorious future of the kingdom under the Tsar's liberal govern-
ment reached its height shortly before the first session of the Seym in
1818.
The Poles expected that the organization of the legislature, con-
sisting of two chambers, would enable them to participate in the polit-
ical process. The first session showed, however, that the deliberate
use of ambiguous constitutional language by Alexander I would pro-
voke numerous clashes between the deputies and the government.
The practice quickly proved that the apparently liberal constitution
was a mere declaration whose provisions were manipulated, avoided
and violated at whim by the tsarist administration. The constitution
lasted until the next Polish upheaval, called the November Insurrec-
tion of 1830. After the defeat of the Insurrection of 1830, Tsar
Nicholas I declared the constitution null and void and abolished both
the Seym and the Polish army. In 1832, he granted the Polish King-
dom, linked to Russia by the personal union, an Organic Statute,
which was to give the kingdom separate administrative and civil
rights. "The Statute, however," wrote S. Kieniewicz, "was never en-
forced and the country was kept in a state of emergency."' 5
Until World War I, the Polish territories remained part of the
partitioning empires of Austria, Prussia and Russia. The Poles living
in Galicia, the Austrian part of the Polish territories, were reintro-
duced into constitutional practices in the period of the early 1860s
when Emperor Franz Joseph granted two constitutional acts, the Di-
ploma of 1860 and the Patent of 1861, which were to regulate the
organization of the governmental departments of the empire. After
the Prussian-Austrian war in 1867 the Reichstrat, the parliament in
Vienna, enacted the constitution under which the Austrian part of the
monarchy was governed until 1918. The empire was divided into two
14. See A. REMBOWSKI, Nasze Poglady Polityczne w 1818 (Our Political Opinions in
1818), in PISMA (Works) 73 (1901-1908). See also Mowa na Obchodzie Rocznicy Wstapienia
na Tron N. Pana Imperatora Aleksandra I - 12 VI 1818 (Speech on the celebration of the
Anniversary of the Elevation to the Throne of His Imperial Highness Alexander the First)
(June 12, 1818); see J. WYBICKI, ZBIOR MYSLI POLITYCZNYCH o RZADZIE REPREZENTA-
CYJNYM (Collection of Thoughts on the Representative Government) 21 (1819).
15. See GIEYSZTOR, supra note 10, at 463.
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parts: "the historic kingdom of Hungary" and the "historic king-
doms and lands" of Austria (including Galicia).16
In the loose confederation of German states, after the early expe-
rience with the Napoleonic constitutions, the era of constitutional ex-
periments began with the revolutionary events of the Spring of
Nations. The Nationalist movement of January 1848 sparked a local
revolution in Sicily which overturned the monarchy in France in Feb-
ruary 1848, and extended quickly throughout Europe, reaching the
German states in March. The governments in the German states
promised to adopt a constitution and the National Assembly was con-
vened in St. Paul's Church at Frankfurt to draft a German constitu-
tion. 17 The framers of the constitution carefully examined European
constitutional models, but drew most heavily from the American con-
stitutional experience. Besides the federal structure which followed
the American model:
references to and comparisons with the U.S. Constitution within the
commission and the National Assembly covered many important
subjects to be dealt with by the draft constitution - for example, the
separation of church and state, and freedom of religion; a republican
form of government; election system; citizenship; immunity and in-
demnity of members of parliament; the presidential system; amend-
ment of the constitution; freedom of trade and occupation; free
movement within the Union; freedom of the press, and jury trial; and
states of emergency.' 8
The victory of the counterrevolution in Germany hampered the con-
stitutional movement until the adoption of Bismarck's constitutions
of 1867 and 1871. The first, in 1867, followed the Prussian-Austrian
war and the formation of the North German Federation in October
1866; the second, the 1871 Constitution of the German Empire, was
adopted as a result of the victorious war with France. Under the
Constitution of 1871, the emperor controlled foreign policy and the
military forces but Germany remained a federal union. Aristocratic-
monarchical order was preserved in the individual states whose rulers
were represented in the Bundesrat (Federal Council). The Reichstag
(Imperial Parliament) exercised the legislative power. 19 Prussia,
16. N. STONE, EUROPE TRANSFORMED 1878-1919 305 (1984).
17. Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional Development, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION ABROAD (L. Henkin & A.J. Rosenthal eds. 1990) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS].
18. Id. at 202.
19. See S. BuRANT, EAST GERMANY: A COUNTRY STUDY 16-18 (1988).
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which led the other German states into the federal union, adopted for
herself a short-lived constitution in 1848. The Constitution of 1850
was very inadequate by democratic standards. 20 The influence of the
German Constitution of 1871 and the Prussian constitutions on the
political life in the Polish province was insignificant.
3. Constitutions of the Restored Polish State After World War I
(1918-1939)
World War I brought Poland independence. The new state
wished to continue the Polish constitutional traditions and, in Janu-
ary 1919, the "Ankieta" group was called to draft a project of the
basic laws. "Ankieta" held seventeen meetings between February 17
and March 12, 1919, and prepared a project which vested broad exec-
utive power in the office of the president. The process for electing the
president was based on the American model.2'
The new Constitution of March 17, 1921, disappointed those
who believed that the new republic needed a strong presidential sys-
tem rather than an impotent "seymocracy. ' 22 In fact, the Constitu-
tion of 1921 referred directly to "the glorious and memorable
traditions of the Constitution of May 3."23 Despite. the 130 years
which divided the constitutions, their major principles showed consid-
erable similarities. The preambles of both the 1921 act and the Con-
stitution of May 3, 1791 began with the phrase, "In the name of the
Almighty God." The position of the Roman Catholic faith, being the
religion of the great majority of Poles, was referred to in the 1921
constitutional text as "predominant among equal worships. '24
Article Two of the 1921 constitution, resembling article five of
the Constitution of 1791, proclaimed that "the supreme power be-
longs to the nation" and explained that this power is to be divided
among the legislature, executive and judiciary. Although the new
state adopted a republican form of government, this form was denoted
20. Id. at 207; see also THE NEW CONSTIUTIONS OF EUROPE 214 (H. McBain & L
Rogers ed. 1922) [hereinafter THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE].
21. See 2 PRAWA PANSTWA POLSKIEGO (Laws of the Polish State) 428 (1918);
PROJEKTY KONSTYTUCjI RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ (Projects of the Constitutions of the
Polish Republic) 139 (1919); see also M. JASKOLSKI, HISTORIA, NANOL, PANISTWo 131-32
(1981).
22. See generally S. ESTREICHER, NAsZA KONSTYTUCJA (Our Constitution) (1922).
23. See CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC OF MARCH 17, 1921, in A. BURDA,
KONSMYTUCJA MARCOWA (The March Constitution) (1983) [hereinafter BURDA]. The Con-
stitution of 1921 was preceded by the temporary Constitutional Act, the so-called "Little Con-
stitution" of February 20, 1919.
24. Id. at 14.
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a "Commonwealth," in reference to the traditional name of the Polish
state in the period of elective monarchy. Similar to the Constitution
of 1791, the separation of powers in the new constitution did not
amount to their equality. The Seym had been given a far more pre-
dominant role among the powers. Although the Constitution of 1921
referred to the traditions of Polish constitutionalism, its drafters also
borrowed heavily from contemporary political systems, particularly
from the French Constitution of 1875.25
As a result of the coup d'etat of 1926, the constitution was
amended. The Act of August 2, 1926, enhanced the executive power
of the president. On April 23, 1935, the constitution was changed.
The new act, known as the April Constitution, declared that total and
undivided power was to be vested in the President of the Republic.
26
The new constitution departed from the spirit of the Constitution of
1791 and marked a distinct evolution of the system toward an author-
itarian government.
27
The fate of Poland after World War II was decided at the Yalta
conference in February 1945. Although the conference declared that
the Polish government was to be created on the basis of free and dem-
ocratic elections, Poland was, in fact, left in the Soviet-controlled
zone. The Polish "government of national unity," which included the
leaders of the Polish government in exile, and the Soviet-sponsored
provisional government, was short-lived. A mass referendum was
called in April 1946 to determine the composition of the Polish parlia-
ment and to determine the public attitude toward agrarian reform,
nationalization of industry and the Polish western frontiers. The elec-
tions of January 19, 1947 proved that the government was not "demo-
cratic and free." The elections were not fair and the leaders of the
anti-communist opposition were in constant threat of persecution.
The top Polish military commanders and underground activists
linked to the London government were under permanent police sur-
veillance. In October 1947, Mikolajczyk, the Deputy Premier and
former Prime Minister of the London-based government in exile, was
accused of being "an ally of foreign imperialists" and left Poland. De-
spite the Soviet assurances to the West in Yalta, Poland remained
under total control of the pro-Moscow puppet government, headed by
President Boleslaw Bierut and the Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz.
25. See id. at 32; see also GIEYSZTOR, supra note 10, at 653.
26. CONSTITUTION OF 1935 (Poland), at art. 2. (Text of the Constitution in separate
brochure of 1935).
27. See Kos, Rabcewicz & Zubkowski, Polish Constitutional Law, in POLISH LAW
THROUGH THE AGEs 249-50 (W. Wagner ed. 1970).
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The organization of the governmental structures was initially
regulated by a Statute called the "Little Constitution," passed on Feb-
ruary 19, 1947. In 1952 the full fledged constitution was adopted. As
this constitution shared all fundamental features characteristic of so-
cialist constitutions it will be analyzed in the section dealing with the
common core of the socialist constitutionalism.
B. Soviet Constitutions
1. Constitutional Legacy of Tsarist Russia
It must be admitted that the constitutional legacy of Tsarist Rus-
sia was not impressive. Rapid westernization and remarkable indus-
trial development at the turn of the century could not obscure the
backwardness of the Russian political system.
The constitutional experience of Russia was much less impressive
than its Polish territories. Prior to 1906, except for the brief period of
activity of the "Zemsky Zabor," popular dissatisfaction could not find
any official representation before the tsar.28 Successive forced steps to
move toward a more democratic government were a failure.
The announcement of a general strike and the rise of peasants
frightened Tsar Nicholas II. On August 19, 1905, he issued regula-
tions for the election of a national representative body based upon a
restricted suffrage.29 On October 30, he signed an imperial manifesto
in which he promised: 1) to grant inviolability of the person, freedom
of conscience, freedom of speech and assembly, and the right to form
unions; 2) to permit the participation in the Duma (representative
body) of the Empire, leaving the further development of the principle
of the universal suffrage to the newly established legislative procedure;
3) to establish, as an immutable right, that no law shall become effec-
tive without the approval of the Imperial Duma; and 4) to vest in the
Duma the right to supervise the legality of the work of the Imperial
administration. 30 The fundamental laws of the Russian Empire of
May 6, 1906, still provided that "the Emperor of all the Russians
wields the supreme autocratic power. To obey his authority, not only
through fear but for the sake of conscience, is ordered by God him-
self."31 The Emperor, along with the Council of the Empire and the
28. J. NErTI, THE SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT 20 (1967) [hereinafter THE SOVIET
ACHIEVEMENT].
29. See W.F. DODD, 2 MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 181 (1909) [hereinafter MODERN
CONSTITUlTONS].
30. Id.
31. The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire art. 4, reprinted in MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONS, supra note 29, at 182-95.
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Imperial Duma, jointly held legislative power. The initiative in all
legislative measures, however, belonged to the Emperor.3 2
The first Duma was instituted by the Imperial order of August
19, 1905, on the basis of indirect elections with limited suffrage. The
Duma never acquired the functions usually associated with a genuine
parliamentary legislature and was dissolved on July 21, 1906.33 The
second Duma met on March 5, 1907, 34 and it was dissolved on June
16, 1907, "because of its failure immediately to surrender, upon the
demand of the government, fifty-five Social Democratic members ac-
cused of plotting against the government." 35 The third Duma met on
November 14, 1907.36 In violation of the fundamental laws, the Em-
peror issued election laws which made suffrage even more unequal
than before.37 The fourth Duma was called in 1912, and survived
until 1917. Its legislative initiative was weak and it remained mostly
an instrument of mild criticism of the government.
The Polish nationalists, led by Romand Dmowski, were active in
all the Dumas which preceded World War I. They tried to persuade
the Russian government to take over the Polish nation and, at the
outbreak of war, they pressed the Emperor's administration to pro-
claim liberation of Poland as a war goal.
The Revolution did not bring about rapid constitutional changes.
Even after the abdication of the tsar and victory of the Revolution,
the Bolsheviks remained a small and relatively unpopular minority
among other revolutionary parties.38 The subsequent overthrow of
the provisional government and the seizure of power by the Bol-
sheviks did not give them a decisive majority in the electoral bodies -
the Soviet and the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly where the
Bolsheviks gained only twenty-five percent of the vote (175 of the 707
seats), was promptly dissolved.3 9 "After one day, when they were un-
32. Id. at arts. 7-8.
33. Id. at 192 n.4.
34. Id.
35. See The Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire art 4, reprinted in MODERN CON-
sTITurTIONS, supra note 29, at 182-95.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Lenin insisted on "recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers'
Deputies our [Bolshevik] Party is a minority, so far a small minority, as against a bloc of all
the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialist and the Socialist-Revolu-
tionaries down to the Organizing Committee." V. LENIN, Tasks of the Proletariat in the Pres-
ent Revolution, COLLECTED WORKS 22 (1964); see also THE SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT, supra
note 28, at 65.
39. J. CURTISS, The Russian Revolution of 1917, THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, THE SOVIET
SYSTEM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (S. Hendel 5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter CURTISS]; see
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able to compel the Constituent Assembly to do their bidding, armed
guards under their control closed the session. This ended the only
genuinely elected legislative body during the whole period of Soviet
rule."' 4 Lenin commented that life and revolution pushed the Con-
stituent Assembly into the background. 41 The Soviets (The Councils
of the Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates), who were more sensitive to
revolutionary rhetoric, survived. "All power to the Soviets" meant
controlled participation under the leadership of the Party that took
power by force.
42
The factors accounted for Lenin's belief that the revolution could
be rescued only without democracy, and, if it was to be the Bolshevik
revolution, he was absolutely right. The Bolsheviks, masters of the
art of grasping power and of backstage manipulations, could not lead
Russia along the parliamentary path. The Party seized power and, as
many Bolshevik leaders explicitly admitted, it could not relax its
domination without the risk that it would be swept from power alto-
gether. 43 Even if Lenin believed that in the future it would be possible
to reconvert the dictatorship of the Party into a dictatorship of the
proletariat, actual practice proved that the Party could never re-
nounce its position without the risk of total defeat.44 The forced "ed-
ucation" of the masses appeared to be completely unsuccessful. In
this sense, reality undoubtedly solidified Lenin's theoretical totalitar-
ian construction.
2. The Soviet Revolutionary Constitution of 1918
Characterizing the constitution-making process, Christopher
Osakwe wrote:
The making of a Soviet Constitution has all the trappings of a theatri-
cal show. The preparation leading to the staging of the show is elabo-
rate, exhaustive, and behind the scene. At the point during which the
general public is brought into the process, the script for the play has
also D. BARRY & C. BARNER-BARRY, CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS: AN INTRODUC-
TION 19 (1977) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS].
40. See CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS, supra note 39.
41. "Thus the Constituent Assembly, which was to have been the crown of the bourgeois
parliamentary republic, could not but become an obstacle in the path of the October Revolu-
tion and the Soviet Power." Lenin, Draft Decree on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assem-
bly, in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 133 (R. Daniels ed. 1960) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF COMMUNISM].
42. Id.
43. See Deutscher, Defeat in Victory, in THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, THE SOVIET SYSTEM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (ed. S. Hendel 5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter Deutscher].
44. Id. at 93, 100.
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been written, the cast of actors who will play assigned roles has been
carefully chosen, and the general manager for the play has been
picked.4
5
In the Spring of 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Com-
mittee of Soviets excluded from its membership the representatives of
"anti-Communist" socialist parties.4 ' In this situation, the Bolsheviks
decided that it was the right time to give their power structures a
constitutional sanction. The leaders of the Revolution did not have
any illusions as to the declaratory character of the constitution. The
act was recognized as part of a superstructure that was supposed to
describe rather than prescribe the organization of power. Lenin did
not take interest in the constitutional works or comment on them in
his writings. Edward Carr wrote:
The period of drafting of the Constitution was one of grave and con-
tinuous crisis both in economic and in external policy, which
threatened the existence of the regime and left little leisure for
smaller preoccupations. ... The Constitution was scarcely expected
to last as a working instrument .... In these circumstances it is not
surprising that the principal leaders themselves took no personal part
in the work.
47
On January 28, 1918, the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets
adopted a resolution "On the Federal Institutions of the Russian Re-
public" announcing that the Central Executive Committee (CEC)
would draft principles of the constitution.48 On April 1, 1918, the
CEC, following the decision of the Central Committee of the Bolshe-
vik Party, appointed a constitutional committee composed of fifteen
members including Sverdlov, the President of the CEC, Stalin, the
Commissar of Nationalities, Bukharin, editor of Pravda, Pokrovskii, a
well-known Marxist professor, and Steklov, editor of Izvestiya.49 The
committee worked for three months and, in July 1918, submitted the
text to the Fifth Congress of Soviets which adopted the constitution
on July 10, 1918.50 The adoption of the constitution was followed by
45. 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 418, § 1.13(c) (K. Redden ed. 1985) [here-
inafter LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA]; see also Foster-Simons, Towards a More Perfect Union.
The Restructuring of Soviet Legislation, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 33 (1989).
46. Decree on the Expulsion of the Right Socialist Parties from the Soviets, reprinted in
HISTORY OF COMMUNISM, supra note 41, at 156-58.
47. E. CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 1917-1923 124 (1951) [hereinafter BOLSHE-
VIK REVOLUTION].
48. See LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 423.
49. BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 125.
50. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 159 (F. Feldbrugge, G. Van Den Berg & W.
Simons 2d rev. ed. 1985) [hereinafter SOVIET LAW].
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the killing of the former Tsar and his wife, children, members of his
family, his personal physician and three servants on July 17, 1918, in
Ekaterinburg."1 Two days later, the constitution, incorporating the
Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People (hereinaf-
ter Declaration of Rights of People), approved in January 1918, was
formally promulgated.
52
The Declaration of Rights of People (located in the first four
chapters of the constitution) was followed by General Provisions of
the Constitution. The General Provisions characterized the Russian
Republic as a federation which recognized equal rights of all citizens
(article 22), guaranteed freedom of speech, opinion and assembly (ar-
ticles 14-15), recognized freedom of conscience (article 13), promised
the separation of the school and state from the church (article 13) and
promulgated free general education (article 17). 53 The constitution
deprived "all individuals and groups of individuals of the rights which
could be utilized by them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolu-
tion" (article 23). 54 With respect to work, the duty of every citizen of
the Republic was proclaimed in the constitution's motto, "He shall
not eat who does not work." 55
The constitution vested the supreme power of the Republic in the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets and, in periods between the convoca-
tion of the Congress, in the All-Russian CEC.56 While the Funda-
mental Law referred to equal rights of all toilers, the drafters of the
Law were quite aware of the different interests of the peasants and the
workers. To counter-balance the considerable numerical superiority
the peasants would have had over the workers if fully equal suffrage
had been adopted, the law provided that "the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets is to be composed of representatives of urban Soviets (one
delegate for 25,000 voters) and of representatives of the provincial
congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants). 57 In this
way, the constitution granted as much representation to one town
51. See L. SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 184 (1971) [here-
inafter COMMUNIST PARTY]; W. CHAMBERLIN, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 60 (1965) [here-
inafter RUSSIAN REVOLUTION].
52. RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, supra note 51.
53. KONST. SSSR, reprinted in THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE, supra note 20, at
385-400 [hereinafter KONST. SSSR (McBain ed.)]; KONST. SSSR, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES 2-16 (J. Triska ed. 1968) [hereinafter KONST. SSSR
(Triska ed.)].
54. KONST. SSSR (McBain ed.), supra note 53, at art. 23.
55. Id. at art. 18.
56. Id. at art. 12.
57. Id. at art. 25.
[Vol. 17:91
New Constitutional Model
dweller as to five country dwellers. The All-Russian Congress was to
elect an All-Russian CEC of not more than 200 members which had
the supreme legislative, executive and controlling power between the
convocation of the congresses. 5 The general management of the af-
fairs of the Republic was vested in The Council of People's Commis-
sars appointed by the CEC.59 William H. Chamberlin commented:
Many provisions of the Constitution were of purely theoretical inter-
est, because they were not carried out in practice (sic). Real power
rested not with the Soviets, but with the Communist Party; and those
provisions of the Constitution which prescribed the methods of elec-
tion, the frequency of convening Soviet Congresses, etc., were ne-
glected or violated. 60
3. The First Post-Revolutionary Constitution of 1924
William Munro observed that the Constitution of 1918 "was not
framed by men who had been elected for the purpose nor was it sub-
mitted to the Russian people for acceptance. But it served as a start-
ing point, and five years later became the model on which a
constitution for the entire Union of Socialist Soviet was framed."
'6'
The consolidation of Communist power in the Soviet Union re-
quired consideration of the nationality question. In order to restore a
centralized administration, the Bolsheviks had to formally prescribe
the links between Moscow and the non-Russian nationalities. The
steps toward federation came from the various republics and led to
the transformation of the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets into
the First Congress of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in De-
cember 1922. On December 30, 1922, the Congress declared that the
state is a Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. 62 The formal fed-
eral character of the Union was to be confirmed by the new
constitution.
On January 10, 1923, the Presidium of the CEC appointed a
commission headed by Stalin to draft the principles of the constitu-
tion.63 In fact, as the sequel showed, "the crucial decisions on the
constitution did not rest either with the commission or with any or-
gan of [the] state, but rather with the Politburo or with some informal
58. KONST. SSSR (McBain ed.), supra note 53, at arts. 28, 30.
59. Id at arts. 35-37.
60. RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, supra note 51.
61. W. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE 738 (1938) [hereinafter GOVERN-
MENTS OF EUROPE].
62. SOVIET LAW, supra note 50, at 161.
63. Id.
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group of leaders within the [P]arty." 64 The new federal constitution
was adopted on July 6, 1923, and ratified on January 31, 1924, shortly
after Lenin's death.65
The Fundamental Law began with the Declaration of the Union
of the four republics: Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian and Trans-
caucasion, which consisted of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Armenia.66 The supreme authority was vested in the Soviet Con-
gress, which was still composed of the representatives of the Soviet
Cities' (one delegate for each 25,000 voters) and provincial Soviets
(one delegate for each 125,000 inhabitants). 67 The sessions of the
Congress were to convene once a year.68 The CEC of the Union was a
bicameral organ. It consisted only of the Council of the Union, a
body of 371 members elected by the Congress from among the repre-
sentatives of the republics in proportion to the population of each re-
public. 69 The CEC also included the Council of Nationalities which
was composed of 131 delegates; five from each union republic or au-
tonomous republic and one from each autonomous region. 70 The del-
egates were elected by the executive committee of the republic or
region. In the intervals between sessions of the CEC, supreme author-
ity was further delegated to its Presidium composed of twenty-one
members.71 The Presidium was to be the highest legislative, executive
and administrative organ between the sessions of the CEC.72 The
Council of the People's Commissars remained the executive and ad-
ministrative organ responsible to the CEC and its Presidium.7 3 Carr
observed:
To sum up the changes in the Soviet structure resulting from the
1923 constitution is a difficult task. The student is confronted at the
outset by one curious paradox. The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic (hereinafter RSFSR) has the word "federal" in its title and
was constantly referred to as such; yet it was, in strict constitutional
terms, a unitary state, incorporating a number of subordinate, though
partially autonomous, units. In the [C]onstitution of the USSR
64. BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 399.
65. Id. at 409.
66. KONST. SSSR (Triska ed.), supra note 53.
67. Id at arts. 3, 8, 9.
68. Id. at art. 11.
69. The number of representatives to the Council of the Union was increased to 414 by
the Second Congress. See BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 401.
70. KONST. SSSR (Triska ed.), supra note 53, at arts. 4, 14.
71. See id. at arts. 4, 26.
72. Id. at arts. 6, 37, 41.
73. Id. at art. 31.
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(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and in official documents relat-
ing to it, the words "federal" and "federation" were avoided. Yet the
USSR was, in essential points, a federation. 74
4. The Stalin Constitution of 1936
After the years of war-communism, Stalinist Russia entered the
period of collectivization of agriculture and industrialization. The
years 1932 and 1933 were stigmatized by the so-called "forgotten hol-
ocaust" - the famine in the Ukraine. Stalin dumped millions of tons
of wheat on the Western markets, while in the Ukraine, men, women,
and children were dying of starvation at the rate of 25,000 a day or
seventeen people per minute.75 Seven to ten million people perished
in a famine caused not by war or natural disaster, but by a ruthless
decree.76 The famine was followed by a period of purges in the Party
and sham trials which resulted in the arrest and execution of hun-
dreds of thousands of people.77 In the midst of the "great terror,"
Stalin announced his will to adopt a new constitution. The constitu-
tion was to be an element of Stalin's "cover-up" of the atrocities of his
system. It was "to convince the world that the Soviet Union was,
after all, a state run according to Law."'78 Victor Kravchenko, a
defector from the Soviet Union, noted:
To survive, man needs hope even as he needs air. Like millions of
others, I reached out for the promise of more human rights for the
ordinary Soviet citizen. We grasped at the straw of hope to save our-
selves from sinking to the lower depths of despondency. Except for
the minority of hard-bitten cynics, to whom the Constitution was just
one more hoax, Communists especially wanted to believe. 79
The new constitution was to democratize electoral law and to declare
that the Soviet Union, after eliminating its antagonistic classes, was to
become the society of all the people.80
On February 1, 1934, on Stalin's motion, the Plenum of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Party instructed the Chairman of the Council
of Commissars, Molotov, to present a proposal to amend the constitu-
74. BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 406-07.
75. See Harvest of Despair, (Film and documents collected by the Ukrainian Famine Re-
search Committee 1981).
76. Id
77. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS, supra note 39, at 72.
78. Id
79. V. KRAVCHENKO, I CHOSE FREEDOM 198 (1989) [hereinafter FREEDOM].
80. See V. CHKHIKVADZE, SOVIET STATE AND LAW 218 (1969) [hereinafter SOVIET
STATE].
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tion to the forthcoming Seventh Congress of Soviets. 8 ' In February
1935, the CEC formed a constitutional commissiona 2 It was formally
chaired by Stalin and consisted of a thirty-one member panel.8 3 The
commission included Nikolai Bukharin, who later confided that "he
alone, with a little assistance from Radek, had written the document
from first word to last."8 4 In the Spring of 1936, the Commission
prepared a draft of a new constitution which was submitted for na-
tionwide discussion. The draft was a full-fledged show of the work of
democratic centralism. In late April 1936, Stalin made preparations
for the trial and execution of the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist
Center," but the Party of propaganda claimed that everyone was talk-
ing about the Stalin constitution. 5 Stalin's decorative deceit was fully
successful. On June 1, 1936, a Plenum of the Central Committee ap-
proved the draft, and on December 5, 1936, the Eighth Extraordinary
Congress unanimously adopted the final text of the constitution. De-
cember 5 was declared a national holiday: Day of the Constitution.
The Soviet newspapers exclaimed: "Let the balalaikas ring, Raise
anew the chorus, Isn't it a happy thing ... the road that lies before
us?"'8 6 Article 1 of the constitution declared that the Union of Soviet
Republics was a "socialist state of workers and peasants. '8 7 Soviets of
Working People were to be chosen on the basis of "universal, equal
and direct suffrage by secret ballot."'8 8 The constitution recognized
the right to work, rest and leisure;89 the right to maintenance in old
age and sickness;90 the right to education;91 equal rights for women
and for all citizens irrespective of nationality or race; 92 freedom of
religion;93 freedom of speech, press, assembly and demonstration;94
freedom of association;95 and guarantees of inviolability of the per-
son,9 6 domicile and correspondence. 97
81. LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 421.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 422.
84. S. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 356-57 (1973).
85. Id. at 366-67.
86. GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE, supra note 61, at 744.
87. KONST. SSSR, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 480-503 (Peaslee 2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.)].
88. Id. at art. 134.
89. Id. at arts. 118, 119.
90. Id. at art. 120.
91. KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.), supra note 87, at art. 121.
92. Id. at arts. 122, 123.
93. Id at art. 124.
94. Id at art. 125.
95. KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.), supra note 87, at art. 126.
96. Id. at art. 127.
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The constitution substituted the Congress of Soviets and the
CEC with one bicameral organ of legislative power, the Supreme So-
viet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), comprised of
the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.9" The Soviet
of the Union was to be elected on the basis of one deputy for every
300,000 of the population.99 The Soviet of Nationalities was elected
by the same universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage on the basis of
twenty-five deputies for each union republic, eleven for each autono-
mous republic, five for each autonomous region, and one for each na-
tional area.100 Executive power belonged to the Council of Ministers
of the USSR 101 which was to be appointed by, and responsible to, the
Presidium.10 2 The Presidium was composed of thirty-three members
elected by a joint sitting of both chambers.
10 3
In the symptomatic way of Stalin's era, two years after the con-
stitution was adopted, the main drafters of the "most democratic
Constitution in the world,"104 including Bukharin and Radek, were
condemned to death for espionage, terrorism and conspiracy. As a
result of the "show trials," the "old guard" Bolsheviks were executed:
in 1936, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Smirnov; in 1937, Radek, Pyatakov
and Sokolnikov; and in 1938, Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky, Rakov-
sky and Yagoda.10 5 Leonard Schapiro wrote:
When the smoke of battle lifted the pattern of the operation became
discernible. Most of the old native leaders who still survived in 1937
had now disappeared. But below them, considerable inroads had also
been made into the network of subordinate secretaries, those men
who had been trained during the 30s. In the Ukraine, for example, in
1938, nearly half of the secretaries of [P]arty organizations were once
again replaced. In Georgia, between early 1937 and early 1939, 260
out of a total of less than three hundred first, second and third secre-
taries of local [P]arty committees were replaced, as well as several
thousand other [P]arty officials. It was a salutary lesson to those who
wished to rise in the [P]arty that nothing less than complete subordi-
nation of national interests to the interests of the USSR, as decided
97. Id. at art. 128.
98. Id at arts. 32, 33.
99. KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.), supra note 87, at art. 34.
100. Id at art. 35.
101. Id at art. 64.
102. Id at arts. 65, 70.
103. KONST. SSSR (Peaslee ed.), supra note 87, at art, 48.
104. See FREEDOM, supra note 79.
105. CURTISS, supra note 39, at 137-44.
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by the [P]arty leaders in Moscow, would be accepted. 106
5. The Post-Stalinist Constitution of 1977
Stalin's death resulted in a wave of popular unrest: a revolt of
East German workers in 1953, turbulence in Siberian camps soon af-
terward, and upheavals of Hungarian and Polish workers three years
later. His death also began attempts to reassess the significance of
communism in the Soviet block. Thousands of political prisoners
were released from labor camps; they had enough time to realize that
some mechanisms of the system were obsolete and needed rapid mod-
ernization. "De-Stalinization," no matter how serious its concessions,
undoubtedly stimulated widespread discussion over the theory and
practice of communism. The discussion also embraced the area of
constitutional regulations.
The newest constitution-making process, which lasted over fif-
teen years, was heralded even more pompously by Stalin's successors.
Robert Sharlet wrote:
The drafting, discussion, revision, and ratification of the 1977 consti-
tution reflected the scope and limits of de-Stalinization as it affected
the policy-making process. Comparing the "making" of the constitu-
tions of 1936 and 1977, it is apparent that the high concentration of
political resources and the severely restricted access to policy-making
arenas that were characteristic of Stalinism have given way to a
greater dispersal of political resources and far more access to these
arenas in the post-Stalin period. An obvious comparative measure is
that the 1936 constitution was little more than a year and a half in
[the] making, including the public discussion, while preparation of
the 1977 constitution required nearly two decades of intermittent
activity.
Certain similarities are evident in the constitution-making processes
of 1936 and 1977. Stalin had formally chaired the constitutional
commission, and his successors, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev later fol-
lowed suit, underscoring that a new Soviet constitution was consid-
ered not merely a technical instrument of government but a policy
statement of some magnitude. Secondly, the political symbolism of
the two documents is similar; both followed periods of intensive in-
ternal change.... Finally, the ultimate products, the constitutions of
1936 and 1977, were intended to consolidate, institutionalize, and le-
gitimize Stalinism and post-Stalin reform respectively. 10 7
106. COMMUNIST PARTY, supra note 51, at 482-83 (1971). See generally Pravda, June 16,
1938.
107. SHARLET, De-Stalinization and Soviet Constitutionalism, in THE SOVIET UNION
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There were an enormous number of amendments introduced into
the Stalin constitution, and it was apparent that, rather than amend-
ing the old constitution again, a new constitution should be drafted. 10
The Constitutional Commission was formed in 1962 consisting of
ninety-seven members. 10 9 The Commission's draft, adopted by the
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union on May 24, 1977, was subject to a further nationwide dis-
cussion in the media during which over 150 amendments and
clarifications were made." I0 At the seventh extraordinary session of
the Ninth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 7,
1977, the constitution was adopted."' Christopher Osakwe
commented:
To the Western student of Soviet constitutional law, the adoption of
the long-awaited USSR Constitution of 1977 will go down in history
as the greatest non-event of the decade. Despite all official proclama-
tions to the contrary, the new document does not break any new
ground in Soviet law. It creates no meaningful new expectations in
the minds of the ordinary Soviet citizens, and it fails to promulgate a
new developmental policy for Soviet society. Nevertheless, a deliber-
ate effort was made to involve a cross section of the Soviet population
in the last stages of its adoption. The impace [sic] of this citizen in-
volvement is questionable."
I2
Comparing the Fundamental Laws of 1936 and 1977, it is appar-
ent that the changes introduced should not be overestimated. The
Act of 1977 did not refer to the "Society of workers and peasants."'
1 3
The state was not portrayed as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" but
as a "socialist all-peoples state," an "indissoluble alliance of workers,
peasants, and intelligentsia.""114 The constitution emphasized the
SINCE STALIN 94-95 (S. Cohen, A. Rabinowitch & R. Sharlet eds. 1980) [hereinafter De-
Stalinization].
108. Between 1937 and 1974, the Stalin Constitution was amended 250 times, affecting 73
of the original 146 articles. LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 508 n.305. For
details on amendments, see S. RUSINOVA & V. RIANZHIN, SOVETSKOE KoNSTrTrISIONNOE
PRAvO 81-85 (1975).
109. In 1966, the size of the Commission was reduced to 75 members, in early 1977 to 54
members, and finally, in April 1977, it increased by 21 new members. See R. SHARLET, THE
NEW SOVIET CONSTrrUTION OF 1977 1-4, 26 (1978); see also LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 45, at 420.
110. De-Stalinization, supra note 107, at 96.
111. Id.
112. LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 421.
113. See KONST. SSSR OF 1977, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM 3-32 (1983) [hereinafter KONST. SSSR OF 1977].
114. Id at arts. 1, 19.
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democratic foundations of the Soviet system.115 It declared that the
Soviet state is organized on the principle of democratic centralism
which "combine[s] unified direction with initiative and creative activ-
ity."' 116 The leading and guiding role of the Communist Party was
emphasized by the constitution.'1 7 The constitution introduced sepa-
rate chapters on "The Economic System," 118 "Social Development
and Culture," 119 and "Foreign Policy." 120 The chapter on the basic
rights of citizens was extended. The constitution declared that the
enjoyment of citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the
detriment of the interests of society or the state, or infringe the rights
of other citizens, 12 1 meaning that citizens' rights are constitutionally
guaranteed only when exercised in a manner consistent to the inter-
ests of society as defined by the Party, "the nucleus of the Soviet polit-
ical system."
122
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR remained the highest body of
state authority. 123 The bicameral body of 1500 deputies was, as previ-
ously, composed of two chambers equal in numbers. 124 Moreover, the
Supreme Soviet remained the most efficient legislative body in the
world. It was expected to approve a significant number of legal in-
struments during two relatively short convocations a year, with essen-
tially no dissent permitted. The Presidium remained the permanent
nucleus of the legislative body and the Council of Ministers was desig-
nated as the highest executive and administrative body. 125
C. Outline of the Constitutional History of Romania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary
The constitutional history of the Eastern European members of
the Soviet block hardly reached beyond the turn of the century.
Romania was established in 1859 as a result of the Crimean War and
the national movements in the principalities of Moldavia and
115. Id at art. 9.
116. Id at art. 3.
117. KONST. SSSR oF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 6.
118. Id at arts. 10-18.
119. Id at arts. 19-27.
120. Id at arts. 10-18.
121. KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 39.
122. Id. at art. 6.
123. Id. at art. 108.
124. The representation of Union Republics in the Soviet of Nationalities was slightly
changed. In the new constitution each Republic has 32 instead of the previous 25 deputies. Id
at art. 110.
125. KONST. SSSR oF 1977, supra note 113, at arts. 119-124, 128-136.
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Walachia. The first Romanian constitution adopted in 1866 was
modeled on the Belgian constitution of 1831.126 The constitution was
amended in 1923 and was subsequently replaced by the royal, authori-
tarian constitution of 1938.
During World War II, Romania declared its neutrality.
Romania soon, however, was forced to accept pro-German cabinets.
Romania's King Carol abdicated in favor of his adolescent son,
Michael. The constitution was suspended and a dictator General, Ion
Antonescu, rose to power.
The coup d'etat of August 1944 deposed Antonescu and led to
war with Germany. The end of war left Romania in the control of
Soviet forces which established authority fashioned on the Soviet
model. In 1944, some provisions of the 1923 constitution were re-
stored. In December of 1947, simultaneous with the abdication of
King Michael and the establishment of the People's Republic of
Romania, the constitution of 1938 was abolished. The new constitu-
tion was promulgated on April 13, 1948. The 1948 constitution fell
within the Soviet model and the second socialist constitution of 1952
was "nearly a reproduction" of Stalin's constitution of 1936.127
Although the history of the early Bulgarian state goes back to the
sixth century, the Bulgars fell under the Turkish rule in the four-
teenth century (1396). Bulgaria remained part of the Turkish Empire
until the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when a new autonomous Bulga-
rian principality was established. The Tirnovo Constitution of 1879,
the first Bulgarian constitution, was praised as one of the most demo-
cratic in Europe. The new state, however, lacked the experience
needed to establish stable democratic mechanisms provided by the or-
ganic law. Hence, over the next five years the constitution was sus-
pended and restored. The principality was involved in numerous
Balkan conflicts during which the more independent rulers were inter-
mingled with Russian-dominated governments. In 1908, Bulgaria,
taking advantage of a revolution in Turkey, declared an independent
kingdom with Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha as Tsar.
In the Balkan Wars and in the early stages of World War I, the
Bulgars regained territories which they later lost under the Treaty of
Neuilly on November 27, 1919. Tsar Ferdinand abdicated in October
of 1918 in favor of his son Boris. In the interwar period, Bulgaria,
126. T. SZYMCZAK, UsTRoi EUROPEJSKICH PANSTW SOCJALISTYCZNYCH (Political Sys-
tem of the European Socialist States) 194 (1983) [hereinafter SZYMCZAK].
127. W. SIMONS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 312 (1980) [herein-
after COMMUNIST WORLD].
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involved in confficts with Greece, underwent a period of successive
coups d'etat and dictatorial regimes.
In World War II, Bulgaria was allied with Germany, but it re-
fused to declare war on the Soviet Union. It finally withdrew from
the war in 1944 and proclaimed its neutrality. Bulgaria appealed for
an armistice with the Soviet Union which was granted on September
9, 1944. Soon thereafter, a Soviet controlled government was estab-
lished. The first Socialist Constitution of 1947 followed the Stalinist
model. It was replaced by the 1971 constitution which declared Bul-
garia a "socialist state" and made constitutional adjustments typical
of the post-Stalinist era.128
Although Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians have history reaching
back many centuries, modem Czechoslovakia and Hungary were
formed as a result of the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire after
World War I. The Czech lands consisted of the Kingdom of Bohemia
and the Margravate of Moravia, both recognizable political entities
since medieval times. 129 Slovakia was carved from the territories
which, after 1867, fell within the lands of the Hungarian crown.
World War I brought crisis to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
war drew the Czech and Slovak nationalist movements closer together
resulting in the formation of Czechoslovakia from the traditional
Czech and Slovak lands.
130
On October 28, 1918, the independence of Czechoslovakia was
proclaimed, and on November 13, 1918 a provisional constitution was
promulgated. This constitution was later replaced by the definitive
Constitution of February 29, 1920.131 The six section 1920 Constitu-
tion borrowed heavily from the 1875 French Constitution of the
Third Republic. The preamble defined Czechoslovakia as a "cul-
tured, peaceloving, democratic, and progressive" republic. 132 "The
system," wrote D.W. Paul, "embodied many liberal principles such as
separation of church and state, guarantees of individual rights, and
due process of law."' 33 The legislative power was vested in a bicam-
eral parliament, elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage,
by a direct and secret ballot, and on the principle of proportional rep-
128. Id. at 35.
129. See C. LEFF, NATIONAL CONFLICT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 11, 26 (1988) [hereinafter
NATIONAL CONFLICT].
130. D.W. PAUL, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PROFILE OF A SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AT THE
CROSSROAD OF EUROPE 18 (1981) [hereinafter CZECHOSLOVAKIA].
131. CZECH. CONST. (1920), reprinted in THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE, supra
note 20, at 310 [hereinafter CZECH. CONST.].
132. Id. at preamble, art. 2.
133. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 130, at 21.
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resentation. 134 Executive powers were entrusted to a strong president,
analogous to the French presidency, elected by the National Assem-
bly (joint session of both chambers), who in turn appointed the prime
minister and a cabinet. The constitution created an independent judi-
ciary and established a Constitutional Court which followed the so-
called Austrian "centralized" type of judicial review, confining the
power to review the constitutionality of laws to a single judicial or-
gan. 135 D.W. Paul observed:
The positive achievement of the First Republic should not be under-
estimated. For twenty years Czechoslovakia had remained a viable
and true democracy, despite being surrounded by increasingly un-
democratic and hostile states. Its economy, despite weak spots, was
one of the strongest and most advanced in Europe. Whatever their
grievances, Czechoslovakia's minorities were treated with less ethnic
discrimination than those of its neighbors - and, to the credit of the
dominant Czechs, the other nationalities were better off than the
Czechs had been under Austrian rule. This unique interwar experi-
ment with the multinational democracy came to an end following the
Munich Agreement. 1
36
The Munich Pact of 1938 was followed by annexation of the
western territories of Czechoslovakia, known as the "Sudetenland."' 137
This precipitated the fall of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Presi-
dent Edvard Benes, denouncing the Munich agreement as a betrayal
by France and Britain, resigned under pressure from Berlin on Octo-
ber 5, 1938 and left the country. The Second Republic yielded to
Slovak demands for self-government and was officially renamed
"Czecho-Slovakia," emphasizing the confederative association. I38
Soon after, Germany annexed the remaining Czech lands as the "Pro-
tectorate of Bohemia and Morovia," while Slovakia was proclaimed a
separate state under German "protection," although portions were
annexed by Hungary. 139 World War II tightened German control
over the Czech and Slovak territories.
134. CZECH. CONST., supra note 131, at arts. 8, 13.
135. Id. at art. 2. In Austria, this model was first tested in 1867, adopted in the Constitu-
tion of October 1, 1920, and amended in 1929. See Z. CZESZEJKO-SOCHACKI, TRYBUNAL
KONSTYTUCYJNY W POLSCE 15-17 (1986).
136. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 130, at 25.
137. See V. MAMATEY & R. LuzA, A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC
1918-1948 250 (1973) [hereinafter HISTORY].
138. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 130, at 28; R. SADLER, CZECHOSLOVAKIA: DEMO-
cRATIc TRADMONS, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, NATIONAL CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS
UNDER HAVEL 89 (1990) (unpublished paper) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS].
139. DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS, supra note 138, at 96-97.
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Similar to other East-Central European countries, the Soviet
"liberating" maneuvers placed communists of Czechoslovakia into
the government for the first time in 1945 and solidified their rule in
1948. I40 A new Soviet-style "Constitution" was promulgated on June
7, 1948. On July 11, 1960, Czechoslovakia adopted its second social-
ist constitution, which upgraded the country's "people's democracy"
status to that of a "socialist republic." The 1960 Constitution was
primarily for propaganda value, allowing the Communist Party to
claim that Czechoslovakia was the second country to have achieved
socialism. The USSR made this claim in 1936.141 The 1960 constitu-
tion has been amended by the six Constitutional Laws.142 The most
important of these was the October 31, 1968, Constitutional Law
which created a Czechoslovak federation consisting of the Czech So-
cialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic.
1 43
The fall of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire after World War I
also helped the Hungarians dissolve their links with Austria. On No-
vember 16, 1918, Hungary was proclaimed a republic. 144 In the
spring of 1919, in the midst of internal disorder and the various na-
tionalistic demands of the Romanians, Czechs and Serbs, the commu-
nist propaganda successfully spread a message that a new state can
only survive as a dictatorship of the proletariat if it is in alliance with
Soviet Russia. On March 21, 1919, a new government, which con-
sisted of the Social Democrats and the Communists, established the
Hungarian Soviet Republic. The Republic lasted for 133 days. On
April 2, 1919, the Revolutionary Council adopted a temporary consti-
tution and on June 23, 1919, the National Soviets proclaimed a com-
prehensive constitution for the Hungarian Soviet Republic.1 45 In
August, as a result of Romanian intervention and under pressure
from the Allied forces, the Hungarian Soviet Republic ceased to exist.
A monarchic system was restored by the Constitutional Statute I
of February 28, 1920, entitled "On the Restoration of the Constitu-
tional System and the Temporary Supreme Power." Hungary re-
mained a kingdom without a king, as the statute declared that "the
140. NATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 129; see also DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS, supra
note 138, at 9.
141. DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS, supra note 138, at 9; see also R. STAAR, COMMUNIST
REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE 61 (1988).
142. 143/1968; 144/1968; 57/1969; 155/1969; 43/1971 and 62/1978; See COMMUNIST
WORLD, supra note 127, at 138.
143. Id.
144. H. DONATH, PREZEMINY USTROJOWO-PRAWNE NA WEGRZECH 1939-1949 (Polit-
ical and Legal Transformation in Hungary in 1939-1949) 6 (1978) [hereinafter DONATH].
145. Id. at 7.
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monarchic power ceased to exist" and the functions of the head of
state were vested in a regent. 1" On March 1, 1920, the National As-
sembly elected Admiral Nicholas Horthy regent with 131 votes in his
favor and ten opposing. Horthy remained in power for the next
twenty-three years.
Although Hungary referred to the country's "one thousand years
of constitutional traditions," it chose not to adopt a single constitu-
tional act until the post World War I period. At that time, the Hun-
garian political system was established by several constitutional laws.
The most important of them was the Statute I of 1920 which vested
the legislative power in the National Assembly. A second chamber
was established by the Statute XXII of 1926. Executive power was
entrusted to the regent and the ministers. The ministers were respon-
sible to the parliament, but were nominated and recalled by the re-
gent. The premier, nominated by the regent, automatically became
the leader of the ruling party - the Party of Unity. The regent enjoyed
the same privilege as a monarch. With the exception of organic laws,
he had a suspensive veto over all legislative actions. He could decline
his signature and return legislative acts to the Assembly for reconsid-
eration. Although his veto could be overruled by the Assembly, in
1937 he was given a right to veto the same act twice in a period of six
months. 147 The successive constitutional acts increased the power of
the regent, who was empowered to nominate, at first forty, and later
during the war, eighty-seven senators.1 48 In 1942, Horthy processed
the nomination of his son, Istvan Horthy, as vice-regent. Istvan, how-
ever, died in a plane accident and a new vice-regent was not elected.
When Germany attacked Poland in 1939, Hungary proclaimed
itself nonbelligerent and refused a request to allow the German army
to pass its territory. However, on June 27, 1941, under strong Ger-
man pressure, Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union and found
itself in war with England and the United States. The ill-equiped
Hungarian army suffered serious losses and Horthy's government
faced the dilemma of either fully cooperating with the Germans or
acceding to the German occupation of Hungary. Horthy's plan to
slowly withdraw from military action against the Soviet Union was
blocked by the Germans. Horthy was deported to Germany. The
functions of regent were passed to the Hungarian leader, Ferenc
Szalasi, of the fascist organization Crossed Arrows, who combined
146. Id. at 11; see also SZYMCZAK, supra note 126, at 237.
147. DONATH, supra note 144, at 18.
148. Id. at 21.
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the functions of head of state and head of government. 149
In the midst of fighting, a new provisional government was
formed at Dobrecen, on December 23, 1944. Hungary was to share
the fate of other Soviet-liberated countries of East-Central Europe.
After some early experiences with coalition governments and provi-
sional constitutional statutes, the communist-controlled Hungarian
parliament adopted the first constitution on August 20, 1949. "Con-
stitution," wrote W. Solyom-Fekete, "was a slavish imitation of the
Soviet-type constitutions, with some variations resulting from the his-
torical and political differences between the Soviet Union and Hun-
gary." According to the constitution, Hungary became a people's
republic which "was the state of workers and working peasants." 150
In 1972 the constitution was amended and article 2 stated that "[t]he
Hungarian People's Republic is a socialist state."1 51 The Hungarian
political system became a typical reflection of a model drafted by the
Soviets for their European satellites.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY: CONFRONTATION
OF EAST AND WEST
A. The Liberal Tradition of Pre- World War II Constitutions in
East-Central Europe
In discussing the constitutional transformations in the socialist
states, many questions naturally arise: Are there any parallels be-
tween the Western and East-Central European constitutional histo-
ries? Does Eastern Europe have any liberal or democratic traditions
to draw upon? Will the ties with the West be strong enough to coun-
terbalance the legacy of the Soviet constitutional experience?
George Sch6pflin wrote:
The Western political tradition always emphasized pluralism and the
fragmentation of power. In Eastern Europe, which was politically
backward, the state played a much more dominant role as the princi-
pal agent of change. This resulted in a politically preeminent bureau-
cracy and a weak society. The independent states of the interwar
period were fragmented socially and ethnically and were unable to
make much progress toward democracy. However, their record did
allow for some political pluralism, which was then destroyed by the
149. Id. at 68.
150. COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 127, at 192.
151. Id. at 197. Another more important amendment of December 22, 1983 established




Communists after the war. 152
Schopflin's points provoke commentary. The first reservation
concerns evaluative elements of his analysis. Although I wholeheart-
edly admire Western democratic and liberal traditions, I have to ad-
mit that the very attempt to evaluate political culture or political
traditions raises my almost instinctive reservations. In public opin-
ion, the terms "progressive" or "backward" themselves become meas-
ures of what political models are desirable and good or undesirable
and bad. The problem is that it is often difficult to estimate "social
progressiveness" in such spheres as art, philosophy, literature or poli-
tics. Some components of political culture are subject to evaluation;
others can only be described. For example, it is possible to measure
the degree of a society's political knowledge or amount of information
available to the public but one can hardly evaluate social emotions or
attitudes. In the same way, political traditions are a function of a
variable that is the sum total of all the social, economic and geopoliti-
cal elements. These elements always have some relativistic aspects
and can hardly be evaluated as clearly "progressive" or "backward."
Admittedly, one can examine liberal or democratic elements of West-
ern or Eastern traditions. One can even argue that from the perspec-
tive of social well-being the Western model was economically more
prosperous, but as a matter of general evaluation, the Western and
Eastern models are not "backward" or "progressive", "good" or
"bad"; they are simply different.
Although one has to admit that the West made more contribu-
tions toward democracy than the East, and emphasized more political
pluralism and the fragmentation of power, these visible symbols of the
West are not synonymous with progress. As Montesquieu remarked
almost two and a half centuries ago, the value of human arrangements
is always relative. The East now faces the prospect of quick liberali-
zation and democratization. Questions remain: how much stomach
does it have to digest these reforms and what should be the right
speed of transformation to secure the "progressive" character of
change?
A second reservation concerns a descriptive element of the tradi-
tional East-West confrontation. A careful examination does not seem
to confirm the often claimed clear-cut distinction between the political
traditions of Eastern and Western Europe. The attempt to set the
democratic, liberal and pluralized models of the Western political cul-
152. Schopflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, 119 DAEDALUS 55 (Winter
1990).
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ture against the non-democratic, state-controlled, statist Eastern mod-
els can only be accepted with numerous reservations.
153
For example, by tracing the roots of Western European constitu-
tional government in the British constitutional experience one sees
that in East-Central Europe, Poland was a country with at least com-
parably mature constitutional traditions. The sixteenth century was a
particularly crucial period for the establishment of royal authority in
both countries. Under the reign of the Tudors, England experienced
the golden age of her absolutism. However, the concept of absolute
sovereignty was mitigated by the English doctrine that the king is be-
neath the law and that the supreme power is vested not in the king
alone, but in the "king in parliament." The principle lex facit regem
acknowledged that the king was a "fountain of justice," but required
him to be bound by the law which was enacted by himself and his
council. The seventeenth century brought more restraints on the ex-
ercise of royal authority in England, and the political system of the
country began to evolve into a mature model of constitutional
monarchy.
In comparison, the monarchy in Poland was neither hereditary
nor absolute. The elective king was not "divinely appointed"
although in theory it was assumed that God directed the electorate
during each election. Theoretically, the monarch was answerable to
no one, save God, but in practice his power was effectively limited by
the vast privileges of the gentry and the activity of the gentry's repre-
sentation. As in England, the power was vested in the "king in parlia-
ment" and the king was required to rule justly. The Polish nobility,
however, worked out much stronger instruments for the application
of their standards to the concept of royal justice. When English abso-
lutism reached its peak, the drive toward absolutism in Poland was
losing momentum. The fragmentation of power in Poland was legally
guaranteed and the system of "democracy of the gentry" was well
established.
Looking at other European political models, the French king was
distinguishable from that of the English and Polish monarchs. The
king in France was above human law and could override both parlia-
ment and custom. The king's absolutism could be restrained only by
the contracts he made with his people, by his Christian virtues which
required him to rule justly, and by the voluntary agreements to en-
hance the prestige and stability of the monarchy. The extent of royal
authority was increased in both France and England by the advanced
153. See generally id. at 52.
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process of unifying the realm, the successful financial arrangements at
the end of the fifteenth century, and by the victory over the magnates.
The trend to consolidate royal authority in Poland was less successful.
The unifying efforts of the Polish kings were counterbalanced by the
attempts of the Polish magnates - "kinglets" as they were called - who
retained private armies, courts and their own clientele. Hence, con-
trary to England, France, Russia and Austria, Poland gradually be-
came a grouping of landed estates ruled by individual magnates. 154
The military potential of Poland was weakened by the pluralization
and fragmentation of power, but the society of the nobles gained supe-
riority over the royal authority. It was Poland, rather than any other
Western European country, that became the early symbol of a liberal
and constitutional monarchy.
It is not surprising that Poland, surrounded by absolute monar-
chies, could hardly defy competitions of the systems which vested the
combined legislative, executive and judicial power in one ruler. It is
also not surprising that Poland was a country which adopted the first
written European constitution in 1791. Although the powers estab-
lished by the constitution were unequal, the Polish Constitutional Act
referred to the doctrine of the separation of powers as the most funda-
mental principle of good government. The traditional attempt to set
the democratic American Constitution and French Constitution of
1791 against the non-democratic Polish Act was verified and cor-
rected. It was often raised that, in fact, the Polish constitution did not
receive enough attention as an act that concluded the centuries long
development of Polish constitutional institutions.155
Hence, a careful examination confirms that the roots of liberal
and democratic institutions can be found in the traditions of both the
Western and East-Central European countries. In fact, the confronta-
tion of the East and the West resulted from nineteenth century polit-
ical developments which highlighted the contrast between the
Western representative institutions, and the absolute empires of Rus-
sia, Prussia and Austria. While Western democracies began to flour-
ish, the restraints imposed on the activities of representative bodies in
East-Central Europe successfully hampered the development of con-
stitutionalism until the last decades of the nineteenth century.
Admittedly, the input of nineteenth century East-Central Euro-
pean constitutional thought into the diffusion of liberal and demo-
cratic ideas, was not impressive. Russian, German and Austro-
154. See GIEYSZTOR, supra note 10, at 224.
155. Two Firsts, supra note 3, at 117-56.
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Hungarian states began their constitutional experiments in the late
decades of the eighteenth century. Until World War I, Polish, Czech,
Slovak and Hungarian territories were still deprived of sovereignty
and were incorporated into the Romanov, Hohenzollern or Hapsburg
empires. 156 Bulgaria and Romania joined the family of sovereign
states in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The first constitu-
tions adopted by these countries in 1866 and 1879, respectively, fol-
lowed democratic European constitutional models. These democratic
constitutional mechanisms, however, did not work according to the
expectations of their drafters.
The clear-cut distinction between the West and East evaporates
again in the period between the two World Wars (1919-1939). The
constitutions adopted by the East-Central European states in the first
decade after World War I referred clearly to world democratic and
liberal constitutional traditions. The Weimar Constitution of Ger-
many (1919), wrote Helmut Steinberger:
contained a comprehensive bill of rights and 'fundamental duties of
Germans.' It included not only the traditional liberal rights, free-
doms, and liberties but also cultural, social, and economic rights and
instituted, under the rule of law, principles of democracy, ordered
liberty, and social justice. The liberal fundamental rights had their
historical roots in the bill of rights of 1848.157
The constitutions of Austria and the Constitutional Charters of the
Czechoslovak Republic of 1920 proclaimed that both countries were
"democratic republics" and introduced into their constitutional sys-
tems advanced models of judicial review. The Polish Constitution of
1921 referred to progressive and democratic traditions of the Polish
Constitution of 1791. The Party of Liberals in Romania adopted a
Constitution in March 1923 which was based on their constitution of
1866. Romania remained a monarchy, but the Constitution sanc-
tioned the principle of division of power, extended electoral rights and
gave citizenship rights to Jews. Hungary did not adopt a single docu-
ment that would set forth their constitutional framework, but it lim-
ited, at least originally, the power of the ruling regent through a series
of authoritative constitutional documents.
The authoritarian transformations of the constitutional systems
of the East-Central European states were similar to the responses of
the West European governments to the crisis of the 1930s. The deval-
156. The Romanov dynasty ruled Russia until 1917, the Hohenzollerns ruled Prussia and
united Germany, and the Hapsburgs were emperors of Austria until the end of World War I.
157. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 210.
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uation of liberal democratic values resulted in a process of fascistiza-
tion in Italy and Spain, brought an end to the Weimar Regime in
Germany, and was accompanied by the authoritative changes of the
constitutional systems in all East-Central European countries.
The traditional clear-cut distinction between the Western and the
Eastern constitutional traditions requires careful scrutiny. The roots
of liberal ideas and democratic constitutional structures can be found
in both the West and East. The confrontation of these two political
models was primarily a matter of nineteenth century historical devel-
opment. The East-Central European countries shared the liberal and
democratic Western trends in the beginning of the period between the
two World Wars while following the authoritarian mode of political
change in the thirties. The East-Central European states can draw
from their liberal and democratic legacy and from certain fundamen-
tal constitutional ideas which, at least in limited periods of their past,
they shared with the West. They have certain knowledge of the es-
sence of world constitutionalism. Their experience, however, with
democratic structures is comparatively less impressive than that of
Western European democracies. In addition, the period of Soviet
domination had a profound and enduring impact on these countries
during the last several decades. All the former satellite countries will
be grappling with this legacy for many years. Hence, the drafters of
the new constitutions have to confront a critical question: how to
enhance democratic and liberal seeds of their own political culture
and set them against the core attributes of socialist constitutionalism?
B. The Common Core of the Socialist Constitutions
Both Soviet and Western constitutional experts agree that "the
constitutions of the socialist countries have [had] common fundamen-
tal features characteristic of all constitutions of a socialist type, re-
gardless of their distinctive feature."' 58 The experts differ, however,
in their evaluation of the general function or character of socialist
constitutions. Some of the Western constitutionalists, such as Mauro
Cappelletti and William Cohen, stress the "declaratory" character of
socialist constitutions which stems primarily from the repudiation of
judicial review by the socialist countries as a "bourgeois doctrine."
Alongside this unitary orientation toward the exercise of state power
there has existed in the socialist legal systems a concept of "constitu-
158. A. KH. MACKNENKO, THE STATE LAW OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 55 (1976)
[hereinafter STATE LAW]. Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-
Party States, 3 REv. Soc. LAW 155-217 (1977) [hereinafter Common Law].
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tion" which differs greatly from Western theory. In Western Europe
the constitution is conceived as a body of more or less permanent
rules and principles which express the fundamental value norms of
the state and establish a program for their realization. In the
U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, the constitution has tradition-
ally been conceived as a "superstructure" over the economy and a
reflection of the actual socioeconomic results achieved. 159
The portrayal of a purely "descriptive" role of socialist constitu-
tions has been strongly criticized by Soviet jurists who pretended to
believe that their constitutions have had a "prescriptive" character.
They used to admit that the socialist constitutions contain "program-
matic provisions" but claimed that "the programmatic provisions of a
constitution, unlike those of a programme (which do not constitute
legal norms), are expressed in legal form and have the force of norms
of law."' ° A.Kh. Macknenko wrote, "What is the place of constitu-
tional norms in the system of socialist law as a whole? Since a consti-
tution is a fundamental law, its norms have supreme juridical force.
All the norms established by conventional laws and other legal acts
must be in accordance with constitutional norms."'161
In fact, the distinction between Western and Socialist constitu-
tions does not mean that most Western constitutions have few or no
declaratory statements and are confined to nothing more than rules of
law while socialist constitutions are manifestos, codifications of eco-
nomic will, and declarations of ideals that contain no legal norms. 162
In most countries of the world, socialist countries included, con-
stitutions are mixtures of legal and non-legal rules. The real distinc-
tion lies in the proportions to which the constitutions confine
themselves to norms of law or provide more general socio-economic
and political statements. General declarations of political or eco-
nomic objectives are usually stated in preambles. In socialist constitu-
tions, these objectives were elaborated into the programs for the socio-
economic development of the state. Topics usually covered were a
confession of faith in the inevitable victory of socialism over capital-
ism, a statement on the superiority of a socialist form of economy,
socialist ownership, principles of foreign policy, communist interna-
tionalism, republicanism and populist power.
159. M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (1979)
[hereinafter CAPPELLETTI].
160. STATE LAW, supra note 158, at 64.
161. Id. at 65; see also the examination of this point of view in CAPPELLETrI, supra note
159.
162. Common Law, supra note 158, at 159.
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The clear-cut distinction between the Western and the socialist
constitutions did not mean that the socialist fundamental laws con-
tained merely "declarations" or that they were not superior than
other laws. 163 It did not even mean that socialist constitutions did not
limit the powers of the institutions they created because they did not
provide for outside judicial review of the constitutionality of laws.
There are constitutions of Western countries which are not supreme
over the legislatures and there are those which do not provide for
judicial review. The real difference stems from the clear contrast be-
tween socialist theory and practice which made many socialist legal
concepts merely legal fictions.
The "declaratory" character of a constitution does not mean that
all constitutional provisions sound like "manifestos." Provisions of
fundamental law sound like "norms," but may still lack any real pre-
scriptive character. In this sense they may command no social respect
to observe these norms or may provide for no politically impartial
institutions capable of executing the constitutional "rules." This is a
case where socialist constitutions, which had never obtained the status
of enforceable limitations upon the communist-party controlled gov-
ernments, merely became useful decorations which were adopted to
disguise the real, unconstitutional distribution of power. As a result,
despite the presence of constitutions, constitutional governments, as
they are known in Western Europe and in the United States, did not
develop in East-Central Europe. Robert G. Neumann wrote:
There is a basic difference between constitutions in a democracy and
dictatorship. In a democracy a constitution, whether written or un-
written, whether supported by judicial review or under a system of
legislative supremacy, is designated to limit, to restrain. Constitu-
tional government in the Western sense is therefore limited, re-
strained government. But limitation and dictatorship are mutually
exclusive terms, and while satellite Europe has a number of interest-
ing constitutions it does not have constitutionalisms. 164
A glance at the socialist constitutions shows that, in addition to a
declaration of political objectives, they all contained descriptive out-
lines of political and economic systems. Following the Soviet doc-
trine, they ascribed sovereignty to the people and declared that the
163. See KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 173.
164. R.G. NEUMANN, Constitutional Documents of East-Central Europe, in CoNSTrrU-
TIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR H 175-76 (A.J. Zurcher ed. 1979)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS].
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source of power is "in the will of the people. ' 165 After World War II,
Soviet jurisprudence proclaimed that the Soviet Union was entering a
phase of mature socialism in which classes disappeared forever, and
even the remnants of the bourgeoisie were destroyed. Society was to
become "the union of all the toilers" and "the organization of all the
people." The classless society was strengthened as a result of the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, but it was claimed that society did not
need that dictatorship any more. Finally, the Soviet Constitution of
1977 confirmed the thesis that the Soviet state passed the stage of
dictatorship of the proletariat and entered a new phase of the mature,
classless society. 16 Chkhikvadze wrote:
This new state [of the society of all the people] is marked, firstly, by
the fact that the law is an expression of all classes and social sections
of society, without exceptions, in the form of the state, and there is no
class or social section in the Soviet Union which is antagonistic in
respect of the Law or vice versa. 16
7
After expressing strongly that authority had to belong entirely
and exclusively to the toiling masses, the socialist constitution claimed
that a socialist state created a democratic apparatus of authority and
that the people exercise power through their authorized representa-
tives. The Soviet Constitution of 1977 contains a provision which
declares:
The organization and activity of the Soviet state are constructed in
accordance with the principle of democratic centralism: the elective
nature of all bodies of state power from the lowest to the highest,
their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies
to observe the decisions of higher ones. Democratic centralism com-
bines single leadership with local initiative and creative activeness
with the responsibility of every state agency and official for the as-
signed task. 168
All of the socialist constitutions adopted a republican (federal or
unitary) form of government. They upheld the idea of separation of
church and state. 169 They introduced special chapters, or at least sev-
eral paragraphs, on foreign policy which were declared to be based on
165. See A. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 167 (1948) [hereinafter
VYSHINSKY].
166. Galin & Faruskhkin, Protiv Antimarksistovskich Postrojenij Burzuazyjnych Tieore-
tikov Gosudarstva i Prava (Against Anti-Marxist Conceptions of the Bourgeois Theorists of the
State and Law), in 2 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 56 (1968).
167. SOVIET STATE, supra note 80, at 218.
168. KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 3.
169. See Common Law, supra note 158, at 167.
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principles of socialist internationalism, friendship, fraternal collabora-
tion and respect for sovereign equality and national independence.
At the core of all the socialist constitutions were the provisions
on basic citizens' rights, freedoms and duties; and on the organization
of central and local organs of state power. These provisions claimed
to have a "prescriptive" character limiting the powers of the institu-
tions the constitution created. They were to give socialist constitu-
tions the force of superior law.
All the constitutions of socialist countries provided an elaborate
list of fundamental rights of citizens: the right to work, the right to
rest, the right to material security in old age and in case of illness or
loss of working capacity, the right to education, the equality of rights
of men and women and all citizens regardless of their nationality or
race, freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, meetings, street
parades and demonstrations, the right to unite in social organizations,
the inviolability of the person, home and privacy of correspondence,
and the right of asylum. Socialist jurists always emphasized the
breadth of the socialist social and economic rights which were never
guaranteed "in the very best and most democratic bourgeois repub-
lics." They also stressed inseparability of rights and obligations of the
citizens. 170
There is no need here to reexamine the record of human rights
violations in socialist states. It suffices to say that the declarations of
the socialist constitutions created no direct rights which could be
claimed by individuals against the state. As Robert G. Neumann
wrote, they were "merely a promise that the legislature would be
guided by certain principles." 171
Judicial control of the observance of fundamental constitutional
rights in the Soviet bloc seemed to conflict with fundamental assump-
tions of socialist jurisprudence. Socialist law theorists traditionally
argued that "the legislature is conceived to be the supreme expression
of the will of the people and beyond the reach of judicial restraint."'' 72
Legislation, not judicial decisions, was recognized as the sole source
of law in the socialist system. 73 It was assumed that the legislative
170. VYSHINSIKY, supra note 165, at 552-57.
171. CONsTITuTIONAL TRENDS, supra note 164, at 178; see also K. GRZYBOWSKI, US-
TROJ POLSKI WSPOLCZESNEJ (The political system of contemporary Poland) 120 (1948).
172. J.N. HAZARD, W.E. BUTLER & P.B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE
LAW IN THE 1980s 320 (1984).
173. See SOVIET STATE, supra note 80, at 221; see also R. DAVID & J.E.C BRIERLY,
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 240 (3d ed. 1985); J. HAZARD, I. SHAPIRO
& P.B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 40 (1969).
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body was responsible for maintaining the constitutionality of State ac-
tions and that constitutional review could not be exercised by extra-
parliamentary bodies. Constitutional control was usually reserved for
internal organs of the legislative bodies, like the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Council of State in Poland, Presidential
Council in Hungary or State Council in Romania, which exercised
many of the powers of the parent body. 174 Supervision over the obser-
vance of laws was vested in the procurator-general who was appointed
by and accountable to the supreme legislative body.175 Traditional
socialist legal theory assumed that an individual who believed that his
constitutional rights had been violated could file a complaint with the
executive branch supervising the office blamed for the violation or
with the appropriate office of the procurator. Until recently, with just
a few exceptions, the constitutions of socialist countries did not serve
as a basis for litigation and no one could go to court to sue for a
violation of his rights. 176 Socialist theorists claimed that, in the social-
ist state, the administration cannot be "set against" individuals. 177 In
accordance with Trotsky's logic, "the workers could not defend them-
selves against the workers." 178 The institution of "bourgeois judicial
review" was criticized as manipulative, an instrument in the hands of
big capital. As Andrei Vyshinsky wrote:
Every sort of statute [in bourgeois countries] is considered as having
force until it occurs to some private person or capitalist enterprise to
file a petition to have it, or a separate paragraph of it, declared uncon-
stitutional. Naturally this right is broadly used by monopolist cliques
of exploiters to obtain a declaration of "unconstitutionality" as to
laws running counter to their interests.17
9
Following Vyshinsky's argument, other socialist theorists widely
criticized the institution of judicial review. In Poland, Professor Ste-
fan Rozmaryn wrote:
The constitutional control of statutes by extra-parliamentary bodies,
particularly judicial and quasi-judicial, is a reactionary institution
and because of that, there is no room for it either in a socialist State
or in a State of people's democracy, which trusts the people's justice
174. To give just one example see KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 121; see
also M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 7 (1971).
175. KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at arts. 164, 165.
176. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS, supra note 39, at 82-83.
177. Letowski, Administraca i Obywatele w PRL (Administration and the Citizens in
Polish Peoples' Republic), 7 PANSTWO I PRAwo 52, 60 (1984).
178. S. HENDEL, THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, THE SOVIET SYSTEM IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 94 (1980).
179. VYSHINSKY, supra note 165, at 339-40.
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and the will of the people.' 8 0
With the denunciation of the Stalinist dictatorship by Khrushchev
and criticism of the deviation of the bureaucratic centralism, socialist
theorists raised the idea that adopting some modes of social control
over the omnipotent administration might be crucial for the regenera-
tion of socialist democracy. The representatives of the developing re-
visionism argued that the administration is never neutral and often
tries to implement political programs which may depart from the in-
terests of the represented class. They opted for reconstruction of judi-
cial control over administrative authorities, which had been abolished
in the countries of Eastern Europe after World War I.
As a result of this opinion, in the late 1950s, the attitude toward
judicial control of administrative acts began to change in socialist
countries. The right of an individual to challenge the legality of ad-
ministrative decisions was introduced by statutes in Yugoslavia in
1952, Hungary in 1957, Romania in 1967, and Bulgaria in 1970.
These rights were later confirmed by constitutional amendments.18'
Also, the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union declared that "actions
of officials, performed in violation of the law and exceeding their au-
thority, that infringe on the rights of citizens may be protested to a
court according to the procedure established by Law."''8 2 In Czecho-
slovakia, judicial review was theoretically provided for by the code of
civil procedure, but there were no regulations that could implement
the statute. Neither had there been any significant attempts to intro-
duce judicial review in the German Democratic Republic. 8 3
In the countries mentioned above, in which the control of the
legality of administrative decisions has been put into effect, individu-
als can seek judicial review of the questioned decision in the regular
courts. This right may be exercised only after all administrative rem-
edies have been exhausted. Moreover, the review is limited exclu-
180. Rozmaryn, Kontrola sprawiedliwosci Ustaw (The Control of the Legality of the
Laws), 11-12 PANSTWO 1 PRAwo 866 (1946).
181. Nowakowski, Konstytucyjne podstawy dzialalnosci sadownictwa administracyjnego w.
Poisce (Constitutional basis for the operation of administrative adjudication in Poland), 4
PANSTWO I PRAWO 70 (1985); see also M. WYRZYKOWSKI & S. KONTROLA, DECYZJI AD-
MINISTRACYJNYCH W PANSTWIE SOCIALISTYCZNM (Judicial Control of Administrative Deci-
sions in the Socialist State) 80 (1978) [hereinafter WYRZYKOWSKI].
182. KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 58.
183. The development of judicial review in Poland is the most advanced of socialist legal
systems and it will be discussed separately. Concerning the development of judicial review in
East Germany, see also M. Wiersbowski & S. McCaffrey, The Supreme Administrative Court of
Administrative Law: A New Development in Eastern Europe, in LEGAL SYsTEMS CYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 45, at 159 [hereinafter Wiersbowski].
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sively to the legal basis of the administrative act. In Yugoslavia, the
Administrative Disputes Act of 1952 provides that any final adminis-
trative act can be challenged in court and that court's decision, after
determination by appeal, is binding. Until the promulgation of the
1974 Constitution, administrative disputes were heard only by the
supreme courts of the socialist republics and the Supreme Court of
Yugoslavia. In accordance with this recent practice, the review of
administrative decisions in the republics of Serbia and Vojvodina is
within the jurisdiction of the regular district courts of first instance,
and subsequently the supreme courts of the republics. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, disputes are heard by the special republic Administra-
tive Court, while in other republics the disputes are still handled by
the supreme courts of the republics.
184
Some countries, like Romania and Bulgaria, adopted judicial re-
view of administrative decisions in general but with several excep-
tions. For example, Romanian Law 1/1967 provided a list of matters
which could not be submitted for judicial determination. The list in-
cluded matters of state defense and security, public order, central
planning, epidemics and public calamities. In addition, some other
exceptions were provided for by special statute.18 5 In Bulgaria, the
exceptions from judicial review related to matters of defense and se-
curity, social control and foreign currency exchange. 186 In contrast,
Hungary's 1957 law' 8 7 enumerated areas in which judicial review was
permissible. Five major spheres of judicial review were set forth: (a)
decisions concerning refusal to include or remove data from the regis-
ters of civil status; (b) matters relating to assignments of apartments;
(c) matters on expropriation; (d) decisions concerning property taken
into custody; and (e) matters concerning taxation. 88 In the Soviet
Union, the right to resort to regular courts was generally permissible
under the 1977 constitution but was rarely exercised, and the list of
areas in which review was possible was not clearly specified.
In the early 1960s, socialist countries began to consider introduc-
ing judicial control over the constitutionality of legislation. With the
exception of Yugoslavia, however, development in this direction was
184. Blagojevic, The Legal System of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in
LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 694-95.
185. See id.
186. Pop, The Legal System of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 211-12.
187. Wiersbowski, supra note 183, at 161-62.
188. Id. at 162. Experts on Hungarian law comment that after the adoption of the new
statute in 1981 there was a tendency to increase the number of matters that may be appealed.
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comparatively less impressive. Yugoslavia, which first started to ex-
periment with forms of judicial review, established the Federal Con-
stitutional Court and the special constitutional courts in 1963.189
Czechoslovakia also introduced some forms of judicial control over
the division of legislative competence between the federal government
and federal units. Russian intervention in 1968, however, hampered
the development of the system which was formally declared by the
constitution of 27 October 1968, but has never been implemented.
Some other socialist countries, like Romania and Hungary, de-
cided to adopt the principle of political rather than judicial control of
constitutionality. This control was exercised either by the central leg-
islative body or by the special organs composed of deputies and extra-
parliamentary experts on constitutional law. Cappelletti states:
The recent Romanian Constitution of 1965, although not admitting
to judicial control such as that adopted in 1963 Yugoslavia has insti-
tuted within the Parliament itself a "Constitutional Committee",
elected by Parliament. Up to maximum of a third of the total
number of its members, the Committee may be composed of special-
ists who are not members of Parliament. The Committee under Arti-
cle 53 of the Constitution has the task of putting before the "Great
National Assembly" reports and opinions on the constitutionality of
bills, on its own initiative or at the request of the bodies as indicated
by the rules of Parliamentary procedure.190
A similar organ was established in Hungary in 1984. The Coun-
cil of the Constitutional Law was expected to cooperate with other
state organs to review the constitutionality and legality of all statutes,
decrees and ordinances. Eleven to seventeen members of the Council
are selected by the National Assembly from deputies and "of the per-
sonalities of political life."' 191
One must admit that, in socialist countries, the role of judicial
review as an instrument for protection of constitutional rights of indi-
viduals was rather symbolic. Practices established in the late 1950s
and 1960s, however, undermined the general principle that judicial
review was incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and
paved the way for the further-reaching development of this institution
in Poland during the 1980s.
189. FED. CONST. YUGo. at arts. 241-51 (1963); see also Law on the Yugoslav Constitu-
tional Court (Institute de Droit trans.); c.f. (1963) 7 and (1965) 14 Recueils des Lois de la RSF
de Yugoslavie.
190. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 159, at 51.
191. CZESZEJKO-SOCHAKI (The constitutional Tribunal Konstytacgjny w PRL in the Po-
lish people's Republic) 19 (1986).
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By further examining the core of the socialist constitutional prin-
ciples, one will find that communist jurisprudence has never recog-
nized the significance of the theories of separation of powers or system
of checks and balances. The Soviet constitutional theory claimed that
the powers should work in accord with the recommendations of the
Communist Party, the leading and guiding force of socialist society.
Article 126 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR declared that the
Party is the most active and politically conscious "vanguard of the
working people." This declaration in the Soviet Constitution of 1977
was moved to the beginning of the constitutional text and put among
the most significant rules (article 6). The Party was introduced as the
focus of power in all socialist constitutions. 192 William B. Simons
commented:
[T]he new constitutional emphasis on, or realistic recognition of, the
party's role has not, however, been to the total exclusion of other
social organizations; in several of the communist countries (e.g., Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Viet-nam), men-
tion is made in the constitution of other political parties, and for the
first time labor collectives are now listed as participants in the resolu-
tion of state affairs (Bulgaria, GDR, and USSR). There is also the
entire system of the organizations of associated labor which are pro-
vided for throughout the Yugoslav Constitution.
193
Socialist law theorists traditionally argued that the legislative de-
partments of government should be recognized as the supreme organs
of power. The legislatures, however, were to meet only twice a year
for two short sessions and between sessions their main functions were
to be carried out by the nucleus of legislative organs called different
names such as the Presidium, the Council of State, the State Council
or Standing Committee.194 In the socialist constitutions, with the ex-
ception of Czechoslavokia and Romania, these organs also took over
the functions of the collegiate head of state.
In the Czechoslovakian model, the Presidium of the Federal As-
sembly exercises the functions of a sort of super-legislature between
192. CONST. OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 1960, at art. 4 (as amended);
CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA 1971, at art. 1-2; CONST. OF THE SOCIAL-
iST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA 1974, art. 3 (as amended); CONST. OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF 1949, at art. 3 (as amended); CONST. OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
1952, at art. 3 (as amended); CONST. OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 1968, at
art. 1 (as amended). For texts see COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 127.
193. See COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 127.
194. See Common Law, supra note 158, at 175.
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the sessions of the Federal Assembly. 195 Czechoslovakia maintained a
double executive model. At the head of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic is the President, elected by the Federal Assembly. 196 The
President could not be a deputy or take any other governmental func-
tion. The President appoints and recalls the Chairman and the other
members of the Government of the Republic. 197 The prerogatives of
the President do not limit the functions of the Parliament, which is
still a Supreme Power, and the legislature could vote "no confidence"
for the Government by a simple majority of the deputies present. 198
In Romania the Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 provided for the State
Council (formerly Presidium). Since 1974, the President of the Coun-
cil also carried the title of President of the Romanian Socialist Repub-
lic. The President was elected by the Grand National Assembly and
his office was vested with the function of head of state.199
All socialist constitutions provided for the parliamentary execu-
tive. The socialist theorists claimed that the system maintained a
functional separation of both legislative and executive powers. The
system did, however, permit some organizational fusing of the execu-
tive and legislative departments in the sense that the heads of govern-
mental departments were allowed to sit in the parliaments. Chris
Osakwe wrote:
Under the functional separation of powers recognized by the consti-
tutions of communist party-states, the executive department consti-
tutes a much weaker arm of the socialist government as compared to
the legislative branch. As the name suggests, the primary function of
the executive department is to execute the laws of the state and to
administer the general policy of the legislature and of the communist
party. In order to carry out its functions properly, however, the exec-
utive department is authorized to issue rules, regulations, and other
executive orders which by their very nature are not a laws stricts
sensu but nevertheless have the force of law. As a source of law,
however, the acts of the Executive department are inferior both to the
state constitution and to the acts of the legislature. 2°°
All of the socialist constitutions declared that the administration
of justice should be vested in the courts staffed by independent judges.
195. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK FEDERATION OF 1968 (as
amended 1970), reprinted in COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 127, at 602.
196. Id. at art. 60.
197. Id.
198. Id. at art. 43 § 2; See SZYMCZAK, supra note 126, at 427-31.
199. CONST. OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA, at art. 72.
200. Common Law, supra note 158, at 178.
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Some of the constitutions, following the Soviet model20 1 provided for
the direct election of judges by the citizens or for the option of either
the election directly by the people or by popular representative bod-
ies. 20 2 For example, the Polish constitutional model provided for the
appointment of the judges by the State Council.203 In fact, well-
known defects of the democratic mechanisms of the socialist electoral
system, made the differences of these two models insignificant.
In the 1980s, the common core of the socialist constitutions be-
gan to break down as a result of a combination of the Polish Solidar-
ity upheaval, the Soviet reforms of the glasnost era and the
subsequent anti-communist revolts in Eastern and Central Europe.
For those searching for a new constitutional model for East-Central
Europe, the stages of this constitutional restructuring warrant a care-
ful analysis.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE GLASNOST ERA
A. Gorbachev's Law On Constitutional Amendments
There is some routine in the process of making constitutional
changes in the socialist system. The initiative usually stems from the
Politburo or Secretary General himself.2°4 It is typical that the pro-
cess begins after the initial period of solidification of power of the
Party leader. Each transitory period in the Soviet Union may be
characterized, however, by the tendency to set up a more collective
leadership of the Party, and this period was usually followed by the
emergence of a single leader who successfully reduced the number of
rivals and introduced his clients to the highest Party bodies. The ten-
dency may be traced through Stalin's triumvirates, 205 Khrushchev's
temporary readiness to share power with Tanastas Mikoyan and
Brezhnev's coalition with Aleksey Kosygin. 206 The tendency to purge
the Politburo and the Central Committee of potential rivals was typi-
cal of the pre-glasnost era. Even today the full Politburo and a sub-
stantial part of the Central Committee are Gorbachev's appointees.
Gorbachev's position as primus inter pares (first among equals) was
201. BULGARIAN CONST., at art. 128; ROMANIAN CONST., at art. 108; CZECHOSLOVAK
CONST., at art. 1010; HUNGARIAN CONST., at art. 48.
202. G.D.R. CONST., at art. 95.
203. POLISH CONST., at art. 60.
204. See LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 45, at 418.
205. See E. CARR, THE INTERREGNUM 1923-1924 257 (1960).
206. In 1964, Mikoyan rose to the rank of President of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet, but the following year he resigned this office for reasons of ill health. In 1964, Kosygin
was elevated to the Premier position. He resigned in 1980 for the same reasons as Mikoyan.
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clearly confirmed, although it by no means signifies the inevitable suc-
cess of his reforms.
In this situation, the will to amend the constitutional law in the
direction that would reflect innovations in political philosophy of the
new leader is natural. According to the Soviet tradition, the constitu-
tional changes were to crown the Party leader's victory over his rivals.
It is paradoxical, however, that the process of consolidation of power
was always accompanied by the declarations of the democratic evolu-
tion of the system. Each new constitution was portrayed as an apex in
the long-lasting process of democratization. Gorbachev's constitu-
tional reform is no exception to this principle.
On October 22, 1988, drafts of the Law on Constitutional
Amendments were submitted for nationwide discussion. Similar to
the period preceding the adoption of the Stalin Constitution and the
Constitution of 1977, the media announced enormous involvement of
the readers whose political maturity was assessed very highly. Pravda
reported:
The most distinctive feature of today's stage in our society's renewal
is that millions of Soviet people have emerged from a state of political
apathy and are adopting active civic stances. The reform of the polit-
ical system should be the most important lever for further boosting
this activeness of the people and directing it into a 5ingle creative
channel.
20 7
On December 1, 1988, the Supreme Soviet unanimously approved, by
separate voting in the two chambers, the USSR Law on Elections of
USSR People's Deputies. The Supreme Soviet also approved the
USSR Draft Laws on Changes and Amendments to the USSR Consti-
tution by a vote of 1344 votes for, five against, and twenty-seven
abstentions. 208
Widely heralded changes of the electoral system are quite vague
and must be examined with cool skepticism. Article 95 of the Law on
Constitutional Amendments provides that "[e]lections of people's
deputies take place in a single-seat and multi-seat electoral districts on
the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. ' ' 209
207. Demokratazatsiya nashay zhizni (Democratization in Our Time), Pravda, Oct. 25,
1988, at 1 [hereinafter Democratization in Our Time].
208. Tass. Dec. 1, 1988, extracted in Constitutional Amendments Approved, FBIS-SOV-
88-231, Dec. 1, 1988, at 4647.
209. USSR LAW ON AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THE USSR CONSTITUTION
(Fundamental Law), reprinted in Pravda, Dec. 3, 1988, at 1-2 (1st ed.), translated and ex-
tracted in Law on ConstitutionalAmendments, FBIS-SOV-88-233, Dec. 5, 1988, at 48-58 [here-
inafter Constitutional Amendments].
1991]
Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.
Amended article 100 provides for multiple nominations. It reads,
"Ballot papers can include any number of candidates. '
210
The reform inspires several observations. First, the extent to
which multi-seat electoral districts were implemented is not clear.
The elections of People's Deputies took place in single-seat electoral
districts. 211 One USSR people's deputy was elected per electoral
okrug.212 Multi-seat electoral districts were most likely tested in elec-
tions of local Soviet people's deputies.213 Second, multiseat elections
are not Gorbachev's innovation. It was confirmed that Stalin spoke
favorably about them to Roy Howard in 1936, although this concept
did not materialize in his Constitution of 1936.214 Until recently,
however, only one person would run for each seat in an uncontested
election with a high electorate participation. Vyshinsky wrote:
Under the Stalin Constitution elections to the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR and to the Supreme Soviets of Union and Autonomous Repub-
lics have shown that the entire population of the land of the Soviets
are completely united in spirit and have demonstrated an unprece-
dented democracy. The days of elections have actually been festive
days of the entire people, when the bloc of Party and non-Party Bol-
sheviks have elected their best people to the Supreme Soviet. The call
of the Bolshevik Party to the Soviet People, to all the electors, the
vote for candidates of the bloc of the Communists and the non-Party
members had exceptional results. In the voting for the candidates to
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 91,113,153 electors out of
94,138,159 took part - 96.8 percent of the entire number of citizens
having the right to vote. 215
The multi-seat districts were tested in other socialist countries.
They were introduced in Poland where four to six representatives
were elected from one district, and in the GDR where four to ten
representatives may be elected from one list. The 1983 Reform of the
Hungarian electoral system also introduced the system of double or
multiple nominations, confirming at the same time the primacy of in-
210. Id. at 50.
211. USSR LAW ON ELECTIONS OF USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES reprinted in Pravda, Dec.
4, 1988, at 1-3 (lst ed.) translated and extracted in LAW ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
FBIS-SOV-89-233, Dec. 5, 1988, at 35 [hereinafter DEPUTY ELECTIONS LAW].
212. Id. at art. 15.
213. See Democratization in Our Time, supra note 207; see also Constitutional Amend-
ments, supra note 209.
214. VYSHINSKY, supra note 165, at 7.
215. Id. at 722.
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dividual districts.216 The multi-seat system or system of multiple
nominations did not democratize the electoral law of these countries
ipsofacto. It is well known that the democratic electoral system of the
socialist countries broke down as a result of a combination of a few
major elements: defective nomination process, defective secrecy, and
lack of adequate and reliable public control of the election's results.
The nomination phase, one of the most sensitive and important
elements of the democratic electoral process, was seriously affected by
the system, which granted the right to nominate candidates to
branches and organizations of the Communist Party (the CPSU),
trade unions, Young Communist League, co-operatives and other
public organizations, work collectives, and meetings of servicemen.
21 7
An average citizen was intimidated rather than encouraged to take
part in this process. The new Law on Elections of People's Deputies
provides that new representatives would be nominated by labor col-
lectives, social organizations and servicemen's meetings.218 Pravda
notes:
Now the situation is changing, although this is not happening every-
where or all at once. This is facilitated by the tremendous prepara-
tory work that has preceded the report election meetings and
conferences. Lists of [Plarty committees for bureau candidates have
been published in advance so that they could be discussed compre-
hensively. Use has been made of questionnaires in order to discover
people's opinion of the possible candidates. Non-[P]arty members
have been invited to the conferences which also helps stimulate col-
lective discussion. 219
This report sounds promising, however, it again resembles Vyshinky's
report on the electoral activity under Stalin's constitution:
Never in a single country did the people manifest such activity in
elections as did the Soviet people. Never has any capitalist country
known, nor can it know, such a high percentage of those participat-
ing in voting as did the USSR. The Soviet election system under [the]
Stalin Constitution and the elections of Supreme Soviets have shown
the entire world once again that Soviet democracy is the authentic
sovereignty of the people of which the best minds of mankind have
dreamed. 22
0
216. See Dezso, Socialist Electoral Systems and the 1983 Hungarian Reform, in Y.B. ON
SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 46-47 (W. Butler ed. 1986).
217. KONST. SSSR OF 1977, supra note 113, at art. 100.
218. See Constitutional Amendments, supra note 209, at art. 100; DEPUTY ELECTIONS
LAW, supra note 211, at art. 24.
219. Strogii Examen (Strict Examination), Pravda, Oct. 18, 1988, at 1.
220. VYSHINSKY, supra note 165, at 724.
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In reality, the reports from the ten-week election campaign that
commenced on January 10, 1989, confirmed the reservations drawn
from the initial examination of the text of the Law on Elections.221 At
least one-third of the people's deputies had to be elected from the
CPSU and organizations associated with the party. The rule which
was later dropped still determined the results of 1989 elections. The
100 seats allocated to the Soviet Communist Party were filled by deci-
sion of the Politburo, and endorsed by the Central Committee.222
The process of "election" of the representatives from the Komsomol,
trade unions, labor veterans and associations of women all looked
similar. Western observers reported from Moscow:
Todays selection of approved Communist Party candidates provided
a dramatic reminder of the Kremlin's ability to manipulate what
have been billed as the most democratic elections in Soviet history.
The [P]arty has managed to devise new electoral rules that guarantee
it a virtual monopoly of political power behind the trappings of par-
liamentary democracy.
223
The new system produced some multi-candidate elections for the
seats that are not allocated to social organizations. The choice was
limited, however, even for this section of the Congress. The new
amended laws guarantee representation to such organizations as
stamp collectors, book-lovers and "friends of cinema," but not to in-
dependent mass movements such as Memorial, which has been sup-
ported by millions of people. 224 Dobbs wrote from Moscow:
Last week's nominating session of the filatelists' association provided
an excellent opportunity to see how the system works in practice.
The meeting was called to choose candidates to fill the one seat in
Congress reserved for the representative of the Soviet Union's
300,000 stamp-collectors .... In the case of candidates who have
been endorsed by the [Plarty, all obstacles have a miraculous ten-
dency to disappear. Unofficial candidates, by contrast, usually find
that they are required to fulfill every exacting detail of the electoral
law.
225
This reflection is also true for non-allocated seats. Observations of the
initial phase of the election process confirm that despite the attempts





225. Dobbs, Sakharov Seeking Stamp of Approval, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1989, at A14, col.
[Vol. 17:91
New Constitutional Model
to portray the campaign as Western-style, its outcome on March 26,
1989, which gave eighty percent of seats in the Congress to the Com-
munist Party, was easily predictable.
The actual casting of ballots was another element that has af-
fected the democratic character of the socialist election process in the
past. The voter, before obtaining a ballot paper, had to identify him-
self and check his or her name on the list of voters. The Party propa-
ganda claimed that the voter could cast a valid ballot simply by
dropping it in the ballot box. This procedure was recognized as evi-
dence of trust for the Party candidates who are located at the begin-
ning of the list. In this case, even if the list had more candidates than
seats allocated to this electoral district, the first candidates on the list
were deemed voted on. The voting booths were usually located at the
distant part of the electoral rooms. To vote secretly, the voter would
have to pass by the whole room in the full view of Party representa-
tives.2 26 The lack of trust in the elective practice (electoral rolls and
the procedure for their compilation; counting votes in the electoral
wards), created the atmosphere of futility and hopelessness that
worked against the attempts to vote secretly. In addition, the Party's
backstage propaganda discretely persuaded the voter to remember
that the electoral behavior of the members of society would be care-
fully watched by the Party and would affect the assessment of individ-
ual contribution to the social well-being, a basic factor in the process
of distribution of social goods. Comparing this approach to the Po-
lish system of the mid-eighties (which nota bene provided for multi-
ple-seat constituencies and was recently radically democratized), Dr.
Wrobel wrote:
On September 26, 1985, just prior to the Seym "elections" Minister
Miskiewicz announced, at a meeting of university chancellors, that
the participation of Polish academic teachers in the "election" would
be the criteria to judge whether or not these academics were in con-
formance with the constitutional principles of the Polish Peoples Re-
public. In practice, this meant that refusing to participate in
"voluntary elections" could lead to the refusal to grant degrees, aca-
demic titles and even loss of job. From the perspective of Polish law,
the minister acted criminally since according to article 189.1 of the
Polish Penal Code whoever by force, illegal threat, deceit or exploita-
tion of dependency interferes with the free exercise of election rights
is subject to the loss of freedom from six months to five years. Unfor-
tunately, Polish law is treated instrumentally by the ruling group, as
226. Id.; see RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 458.
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a tool serving exclusively to maintain power. The minister is free.227
It has to be admitted that, as far as the elective mechanisms are
concerned, the reform was a major sign of the restructing of the So-
viet legal system. The pressure described above, which always accom-
panied socialist elections, was not eliminated, but significantly
reduced. The first session of the convened Congress did not bring
major surprises but demonstrated, however, that perestroika is a risky
game and that Gorbachev is not fully in control of the forces he un-
leashed. 228 Gorbachev easily won unanimous nomination of the Party
and was elected President facing only symbolic opposition of the Con-
gress, which is still composed eighty percent by members of the Com-
munist Party.229 In the voting, Gorbachev's word still prevails.
However, the deputies voted down the government's candidates to the
Supreme Soviet commissions.2 30 Jeff Trimble wrote from Moscow,
"when it came to talking, arguing, shouting, criticizing and insulting,
this Congress bowed to no one. '231
One reform of the legislative structures to shift power from the
Party to the representative bodies was widely heralded as another ma-
jor element of constitutional restructuring. A Pravda editorial
declared:
The draft laws are the legal foundation for the reform.... The sovi-
ets of people's deputies proved powerless. The work of law enforce-
ment organs weakened drastically. . . . The additions and
amendments to the USSR Constitution and the new law on elections
are extensive. They are aimed primarily at the democratization of
our entire life and the return of power to the soviets of people's depu-
ties, placing them above all other state institutions. It is essentially a
case of full power for the people.
232
The amended Fundamental Laws draw from the tradition of the
first constitutions (1918 and 1924) which provided for a double legis-
lative body: the Congress and its nucleus CEC, itself a bicameral
body since 1924. The new Law vests the supreme power in the USSR
Congress of People's Deputies. 233 The Congress consists of 2250
227. Wrobel, The Drama of Polish Education Continues, STADIUM PAPERS 3 (1987).
228. See Trimble, Reform is Risky Business, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 19,
1989, at 27-28 [hereinafter Trimble].
229. Remerick, Sakharov Sees Gorbachev at Risk, Wash. Post, June 22, 1989, at A34, col.
1.
230. Id.
231. Trimble, supra note 228, at 28.
232. Democratization in Our Time, supra note 207.
233. Constitutional Amendments, supra note 209, at art. 108.
[Vol. 17:91
New Constitutional Model
elected deputies who are comprised of the following: 750 territorial
electoral districts with an equal number of voters; 750 from national-
territorial electoral districts (thirty-two deputies from each union re-
public, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five deputies
from each autonomous region, and one deputy from each autonomous
area); and 750 deputies from all-union social organizations (CPSU
elects 100 deputies, USSR trade unions elect 100 deputies, cooperative
organizations elect 100 deputies, Komsomol elects seventy-five depu-
ties, women's councils elect seventy-five deputies, organizations of
war and labor veterans elect seventy-five deputies, associations of sci-
entific workers elect seventy-five deputies, USSR creative unions elect
seventy-five deputies and other legally constituted social organizations
elect seventy-five deputies).
234
The reservation of a bloc of one-third of the seats for the CPSU
and other social organizations was recognized as a controversial de-
parture from Western practice and abandoned once the new Congress
was formed.
235
The Congress elects its nucleus body, a 450-person, bicameral,
USSR Supreme Soviet which is "the standing legislative, administra-
tive and monitoring organ of the USSR state power. ' ' 236 The USSR
Supreme Soviet has two chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities, which are numerically equal and possess equal
rights.237 The chambers are elected at the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies by a general vote by the deputies.238 The Soviet of the
Union was elected from among the USSR people's deputies, the terri-
torial electoral districts and the USSR people's deputies from the so-
cial organizations. 239 The Soviet of Nationalities is elected from
among the USSR people's deputies, the national-territorial electoral
districts and the social organizations in accordance with the following
norms: eleven deputies from each union republic, four deputies from
each autonomous republic, two deputies from each autonomous re-
gion and one deputy from each autonomous area.
240
Elected by the clear Party majority, the Supreme Soviet gave
Gorbachev less control over the proceedings than was expected. The
234. DEPUTY ELECTIONS LAW, supra note 211, at arts. 15, 17, 18. For the full text of
art. 18, see Pravda, Dec. 4, 1989, at 1.
235. Dobbs, Gorbachev Appeals for Political Reforms, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1988, at A34,
col. 1.
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number of radical deputies, who occupied up to thirty percent of the
seats in the Congress, was reduced to between ten and fifteen percent
in the Supreme Soviet. Nonetheless, Gorbachev faced unexpectedly
strong opposition against his nomination of Politburo member,
Anatoly Lukyanov, as first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet
and in several votes on national minorities issues.24
1
Although the overall reaction of the Western media was
favorable, it must be cautiously noted that the laws introduced few
new elements into the socialist constitutional framework. The func-
tioning of the double legislative body composed of the huge Congress
and the smaller, but still bicameral, nucleus organ (the Central Execu-
tive Committee or Supreme Soviet), was well-tested in the 1920s and
1930s. The Soviet practice demonstrated that the Congress of several
thousand delegates are handicapped by their size and are typically
more responsive to the Party rhetoric. The organization of the Party
Congress proved that they may be prepared in advance and may be
held in an atmosphere encouraging no symbolic or dissenting debate.
Observations of the recent Congress indicate how much has
changed in the Soviet political culture. In fact, using the disguise of a
revolutionary reform, Gorbachev tried to reintroduce well-known leg-
islative structures. This strategy was, however, only partially success-
ful. Gorbachev still controls the Congress and the Supreme Soviet,
but not without effort anymore. The evaluation of his personal posi-
tion is, in this situation, extremely difficult. His nomination to the
position of the President of the Supreme Soviet enhanced his power in
light of the new constitutional law. The new law limited the tenure
for this position to ten years (two five-year successive terms), but ex-
tended the functions of the President as head of state who chaired the
powerful Defense Council and named candidates for the posts of
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR General Procura-
tor, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and other high officials.
The combination of the position of the General Secretary of the Party
with the presidency and the announced combination of the equivalent
positions on the local level could hardly favor the announced "revival
of the absolute power of the soviets. '242
On February 27, 1990, the draft law was approved and marked
the further shift in power from the Communist Party and the Soviet
241. Dobbs, Soviet Reformers Suffer Broad Defeat in Key Legislature Vote, Wash. Post,
May 28, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
242. Tass, Oct. 22, 1988, extracted in "Changes to Enhance Democracy," FBIS-SOV-88-
2-5, Oct. 24, 1988, at 50.
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legislature to the President. In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected
to a four year term as President of the Republic (a different position
than the previously held post of the President of the Supreme Soviet)
by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Further, elections for
five-year terms will be by nationwide popular vote.
243
The new laws raise an array of concerns, especially in the north-
ern republics of the Soviet Union. The widely heralded, but vaguely
implemented, shift from the Party to the legislature was accompanied
by restrictions on public demonstrations and the freedom of associa-
tion.244 The tide of resistance to communism and to Russian domina-
tion swept among the Soviet captive nationalities in 1989, and put
Gorbachev under tremendous pressure. By unanimous vote, the Lith-
uanian legislature declared the 1940 annexation of its country by the
Soviet Union void, and the Communist Party of Lithuania separated
itself from Moscow center. 245 The Estonian Parliament voted on the
controversial residency requirement (later suspended), in its new elec-
tion law.246 In spite of Moscow's warnings, the Lithuanians and Es-
tonians followed East European countries and abolished the clause in
their constitutions giving the Communist Party a leading position - in
fact, a monopoly of power.
247
Responding to the threat of a further disintegration of the Soviet
Union, Gorbachev released, in November 1990, his new "Draft Union
Treaty" which is to be signed by all member states of the Soviet
Union.248 The Draft Union Treaty contains a lot of typical commu-
nist rhetoric: it denounces racialism, chauvinism, nationalism and au-
thoritarianism. It declares protection of culture and native languages
of member states, primacy of human rights, freedom of religion, infor-
mation, personal freedoms, and fundamental principles of democracy.
The new Draft Treaty provides that the new unions' membership will
be voluntary but it does not give the member states the right to secede
which was clearly guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution of 1977.249
243. Remnick, Presidential Bill Passes in Moscow: Gorbachev Prevails After Angry Debate
Over 'Dictatorship', Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Clines, Gorbachev Forces Bill on
Presidency Past Legislature, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
244. See Remnick, Angry Estonians to Discuss Changes in Constitution, Wash. Post, Nov.
4, 1988, at A30, col. 1.
245. See Keller, Lithuania Declares Annexation by Moscow Void, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
1989, at A5, col. 1.
246. See Fein, Estonia Suspends Part of a Disputed Vote Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989,
at A5, col. 1.
247. Remnick, Multi-Plan Adopted by Lithuania, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1989, at A9, ol. 1.
248. Draft Union Treaty 24 Nov. 1990, Pravda, Special Supplement, reprinted in Survey
of World Broadcasts, Nov. 26, 1990 [hereinafter Draft Union Treaty].
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Instead the Treaty declares that "Members of the union may raise the
question of terminating the membership of the USSR of a republic
that violates the terms of the treaty and the commitments it has
assumed. '2
50
The Union would receive wide powers over foreign policy, eco-
nomic development, defense, trade, social policy, communication,
transportation, education, public order and crime protection. The
Draft Treaty states that "Republic legislation on the territory of the
republics takes precedence in all questions with the exception of those
which are ascribed to the union's jurisdiction. ' 251 Also, republics are
entitled to challenge the USSR if it contravenes the republic constitu-
tion and if it exceeds the powers of the Union. The disputes are to be
resolved by conciliation procedures or are passed to the newly estab-
lished USSR Constitutional Court. The Court was set up for moni-
toring the compliance of USSR and republican laws with the union
treaty and the USSR Constitution.
252
It has to be noted that the new Draft Treaty vests the legislative
power in the union in the USSR Supreme Soviet without any refer-
ence to the Congress. The USSR President is to be the guarantor of
the observance of the union treaty, the commander-in-chief of the
USSR armed forces and the head of the union state exercising
supreme executive power. The USSR prime minister and the cabinet
of ministers will be both subordinated to the USSR President and re-
sponsible to the USSR Supreme Soviet.
253
The adoption of the new treaty of the Union was preceded by the
nation-wide referendum (on March 17, 1991) which was held to an-
swer the question: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic as a renewed federation of
equal Soviet republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of
any nationality will be fully guaranteed. ' 254 The referendum which
was conceived to legitimize Gorbachev's efforts to keep the Union to-
gether, alerted the Baltic states which held their own referenda to
confirm the will of their people to live in "an independent and demo-
cratic republic." The Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia
pressure from the Soviet Republics Gorbachev may introduce the right to secede into the
revised version of the Draft Union Treaty. See Yeltsim Launches New Russian Reform Drive,
Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
250. See Draft Union Treaty, supra note 248, at art. 1.
251. d at art. 9.
252. Id at art. 16.
253. Id. at art. 15.
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have refused to take part in the federal referendum on the grounds
that they have no intention of negotiating a new union treaty. The
Russian Republic asked the voters to also approve the idea of a popu-
larly elected President. While the people in the Baltic Republics
voted overwhelmingly in favor of seceding from the Soviet Union, the
unofficial results of the federal referendum showed that Gorbachev's
proposal was approved by seventy-six percent of the people who
voted. The referendum was also Yeltsin's electoral triumph as sev-
enty percent of the voters in Russia said they wanted a popularly
elected President. 255
Summarizing, with all power vested in him, Gorbachev seems to
be vulnerable and more exposed to the criticism of the Party's con-
servatives and the Soviet workers. 256 In light of his domestic dis-
tresses, the current legalization of the Ukrainian Uniate Church
appears almost suicidal. An inevitable process of democratization
and liberalization of religious life will undoubtedly contribute to the
new tide of social ferment. What Gorbachev still does not seem to
comprehend is that those who are feared a great deal are sometimes
admired, but those who are feared a little bit are usually hated. He
does understand, however, that glasnost has its limits. To survive he
has to retain control of his crumbling empire and, most likely, crack
down on the rebelling national minorities, workers, and again on the
Party's conservatives. In a tradeoff presented silently to the West, the
East European freedom is offered as a price paid up-front for the tol-
erance to an inevitable upcoming domestic confrontation in the Soviet
Union. These possible implications of perestroika must be well ana-
lyzed in the West. In 1988, Sakharov claimed that so far the Soviet
people faced "perestroika only from above. ' 257 After one year of ex-
perimenting with constitutional restructuring it is quite clear that per-
estroika is now hardly controllable from above. The question
remains, however, whether it is still reversible.
B. Poland's Peaceful Revolution
The anti-communist upheaval in Poland was often characterized
as "a peaceful revolution" 258 but it would be, perhaps, more accurate
to speak about the series of events or to call the Polish transformation
255. See Nelan, Gorbachev's Nightmare, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991, at 45; Remnick, Soviet Vote
Supports Two Rivals, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
256. Shlapentokh, Gorbachev's Real Foe - The Soviet Workers, Wash. Post, Nov. 26,
1989, at C2, col. 1.
257. Sakharov Sees Threat to Reform, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
258. See Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1989, at A21-25.
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an "evolution," rather than to present it as a sudden and radical revo-
lutionary change. The last attempt to throw off communist control
and establish the first non-communist government took almost a dec-
ade in Poland. It took only months and sometimes only weeks to
successfully spread the crisis of communism to the other countries of
Eastern Europe. In fact, the Polish "revolution" did not begin in the
eighties. It started with the establishment of the communist system
after World War II and proceeded through the consecutive Polish
upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 to end up with the Solidarity
era of the 1980s.25 9
The post-war Polish Constitution of 1952 was adopted during a
periods of intense bolshevisation. The fear and feeling of futility prac-
tically paralyzed the anti-communist opposition until the mid-1950s.
In the late 1950s the political atmosphere began to change. Stalin's
death in 1953 and that of Polish party Boleslaw Bierut at the Soviet
Party Congress following Stalin's death, revitalized the new, predomi-
nantly intellectual opposition to Stalinist orthodoxy. The new pat-
terns of dissidence developed within the Soviet communist party and
spread to other countries of the Soviet bloc. Intellectual revisionism
did not intend to depart from Marxism; its proponents wanted to
"purge communism of abuses," "reform Marxism" and "go back to
sources. ' ' 26° Revisionism did not attack basic socialist dogmas.. It
criticized the role of party ideology, contributing to its disintegration,
but still defended the possibility of "reform from within." Revision-
ists believed in the socialist future of Soviet bloc countries, in the pos-
sibility of "socialism with a human face;" almost all were determined
to retain the communist party domination of their countries. Even
the most militant revisionists, highly critical of their communist
party's policies, manifested their attachment to socialism and believed
that they would be able to offer an alternative and viable socialist
political program.
Gradually, however, the optimistic vision of widespread reform
turned out to be nothing but a series of disappointments. When the
Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956, the optimism of believers in the
"new deal" was dealt a shattering blow. After popular unrest in Bu-
dapest and Poland was suppressed, the Soviet regime and authorities
of the satellite countries turned their attention to strengthening party
259. For more profound analysis of the process of the collapse of communism in Poland
see R. R. LUDWIKOWSKI, THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM, ITS MEANING, ORIGINS AND FACES
(1986).
260. L. KOLAKOWSKI, 3 MAIN CURRENTS IN MARXISM 487 (1978).
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discipline and purging dissenters. In Poland, which avoided a Soviet
invasion, an optimistic faith in the liberal policy of Gomulka's new
government lasted a little longer. Yet in 1957, Gomulka proclaimed
that revisionism was worse than the distortions of Stalinism. Revolu-
tionists soon discovered that, despite de-Stalinization, the main insti-
tutions of the Soviet system remained essentially Stalinist.
Disappointed and demoralized, some young rebels joined the group of
party cynics. Others needed more time to develop new projects and
plans.
In the early 1960s, Czech and Polish revisionists took a step for-
ward. Gradually, they began to realize that the deficiencies, discussed
so broadly, had become permanent components of communist re-
gimes. The awareness that a process of further deterioration of the
system was inevitable gradually spread over intellectual circles in
Eastern Europe. During 1963 and 1964, the Gomulka regime in Po-
land resumed a policy of restricting democratic rights, which was
temporarily suspended after the "Polish October" in 1956. It shut
down the leading liberal weeklies. These events led two young intel-
lectuals from Warsaw University, Jack Kuron and Karol Modzelew-
ski, to submit An Open Letter to Communist Party Members to the
Warsaw University branch of the Polish United Workers Party. On
November 14, 1964, police searched the home of Karol Modzelewski
(whose father was nota bene, a top-ranking party official) and uncov-
ered an unfinished manuscript of the letter. At the end of November,
Modzelewski and Kuron released the text of their letter, and in 1965,
were tried and sentenced for three, and three-and-a-half years, respec-
tively. The letter was published as a separate brochure in the West.
In the spring and summer of 1968, several Czechoslovak periodicals
published articles by Czech intellectuals such as L. Vaculik, I. Svitak
and V. Havel. They provoked the events of the so-called "Prague
Spring of 1968" which were followed by the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia. The events had a fundamental significance for the
education of a whole generation of Polish intellectuals. Until 1968,
most of them believed that, with time, even the most orthodox com-
munist leaders would be able to see the crisis of their model and
would try, when pressed by social forces from outside of the party, to
modify it. The experience of the late 1960s, followed by the new wave
of popular unrest in Poland in 1970, strongly undermined this belief.
The events of 1970 resulted in the intra-party shifts and purges
which elevated the pragmatically oriented clique of Edward Gierek.
By the mid-1970s, the failure of Gierek's "economic recovery" pro-
gram produced an increase in social tension and a new wave of unrest.
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These tensions culminated in 1976 and the events of the Polish sum-
mer of 1980, which brought to life in Poland the first independent
trade union - Solidarity.
The events which preceded and followed the imposition of mar-
tial law in Poland in December 1981 are well known in the West.261
It may be argued that without the gradual process of maturation of
the crisis of communism in all countries of the Soviet bloc and
Gorbachev's transformations of the glasnost era, the reemergence of
the Polish Solidarity in the late 1980s could not have occurred. Still,
one has to admit that the Polish experiment began long before
Gorbachev initiated his program of restructuring the socialist econ-
omy. Poland's peaceful revolution was more than a sheer by-product
of perestroika.
In 1985, General Jaruzelski resigned as prime minister, although
he remained the First Secretary of the Polish United Worker's Party.
After the party-controlled elections in 1985, he was replaced by
Zbigniew Messner. Messner's successive attempts to cure Poland's
collapsing economy became a total failure and, as a result of a new
tide of labor unrest in 1988, Messner resigned and the Party turned
the government over to Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who announced his
support for ideas of political pluralism and declared his readiness to
hold discussions with the opposition.
The roundtable negotiations began in February 6, 1989, and
culminated on April 5. Ernest Skalski, a prominent Polish journalist
and one of the editors of Solidarity's new daily Gazeta Wyborcza
(Electoral Gazette), reported:
First of all despite the shape of the table, the negotiations were really
a bilateral affair between the authorities and the opposition repre-
sented by Solidarity. There were three primary discussion "subt-
ables," concerned with politics, economics and the trade union
question. These dealt with issues ranging from mass media accessi-
bility, the independence of the judiciary and local self-rule to the cre-
ation of a new government body and the Office of the President. The
proceedings at the subtables were reported in the press and on televi-
sion, with the authorities' delegates underlining how much was ac-
complished and the similarities in the objectives of both sides.
Indeed, the government needed to appear conciliatory; it wanted to
give an impression that it is gaining the support of the challengers
and that an entente is around the corner. 262
261. Id. at 47-49.
262. Skalski, After the Roundtable-Poland Turns to the Polls, NEW LEADER, Apr. 3-17,
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In fact, however, the main decisions were taken in an isolated
government building in Magdalenka, near Warsaw, where Walesa
with his closest advisors met with the chief of the governmental dele-
gation, Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak. 263 After several succes-
sive deadlocks, a major breakthrough for the roundtable talks
occurred when the regime's negotiators offered a real novelty: the
establishment of a Senate, a Second Chamber in the Polish parliament
that would be elected in a truly democratic election in which the party
coalition would compete with opposition for all seats. Before the gov-
ernment had time to reconsider all consequences of the proposal, it
was accepted by Bronislaw Gieremek, one of the opposition delega-
tion leaders. The deal was made.
264
The opposition agreed to political pluralism in exchange for permis-
sion to participate in elections. This pluralism meant the re-legaliza-
tion of Solidarity, Rural Solidarity and the rebellious Independent
Student's Association and the possibility of reviving various other or-
ganizations that were dissolved by the authorities after the imposition
of martial law. The regime has also promised further liberalization of
censorship and some independence for the judiciary -both to a degree
that was difficult to determine. 2
65
It was decided that the provisions of the roundtable accords should be
incorporated in the constitution in a way that would reflect Poland's
democratic traditions.
The constitutional changes were adopted in great haste shortly
after the roundtable accords were concluded. The constitutional
amendments provided that the National Assembly would consist of
two chambers: the Seym (or Diet) and the Senate. Electoral liberty
for the 460 seat Seym was limited. The opposition could freely nomi-
nate candidates for thirty-five percent of the legislative mandate.
Placement on the ballot required 3,000 voter signatures from a given
province. 266 Sixty percent of the legislative seats were to belong to the
coalition of the communist party (Polish United Worker's Party) and
its satellite parties (Democratic Association and United Peasants'
Party). Five percent of the seats were allocated to pro-Communist
Catholic groups.
The elections to the Senate were not subject to any limitations.
The Senate was composed of 100 senators, two from each of the forty-
263. Id. at 7.
264. Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1989, at Al.
265. Skalski, supra note 262, at 7.
266. Electoral Law, reprinted in Rzeczypospolita (Republic), Apr. 11, 1989, at art. 41
[hereinafter Electoral Law].
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seven national voivodships and six from the two largest agglomera-
tions of Warsaw and Katowice. 267 To claim the seats in the Seym and
the Senate, the candidates had to receive more than one half of the
valid voters, otherwise a new round of elections would have to be
held.26
8
Solidarity's election to the Polish Parliament in June of 1989
gave it dominance in the new, freely elected Senate. The union cap-
tured ninety-nine of 100 seats. Solidarity also won thiry-five percent,
or 161, of the seats in the Seym. The communists and their allies
suffered a crushing rejection by voters in the first round of the elec-
tion. All but two of the thirty-five Communist Party officials who ran
unopposed on a so-called "National List," including eight members of
the Politburo, failed to win the fifty percent of votes necessary to
claim the seats allocated to them. Two hundred and niney-five seats
out of 299 left to the Communist allies had to be filled in the second
round of election. The morning after the vote, General Jaruzelski was
said to admit to his top aides, "Our defeat is total. A political solu-
tion will have to be found."
269
Although Jaruzelski was elected the Polish President, his govern-
ment, led by General Kiszczak, could not form a viable coalition.
Walesa's negotiations with two minor parties resulted in a Solidarity-
led coalition. On August 24, 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, an editor of
Solidarity's weekly newsletter, Tygodnik Solidarnosc, became the new
premier of Poland. On September 12, 1989, the Seym confirmed the
coalition government's cabinet. Four ministers (agriculture, justice,
environment and health) were allocated to the United Farmers' Party;
the commerce and technical development ministries were allocated to
the Democratic Association; the defense, the interior, transport and
foreign trade ministries were given to the Polish United Workers'
Party. Solidarity took over major economic ministries: communica-
tion, labor, central planning, country planning and building, industry,
finance, culture, art and education. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was taken over by an independent Polish scholar. Poland's peaceful
revolution was complete.
Since the completion of the roundtable talks, the 1952 Constitu-
tion was amended five times. Three amendments introduced major
changes and two made marginal adjustments to the constitutional vo-
cabulary. The most significant amendments were adopted on April 7,
267. See Skalski, supra note 262, at 7.
268. See Electoral Law, supra note 266, at 3.
269. Meyer, Solidarity's Stunning Win, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1989, at 42.
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1989,270 published on September 7, 1990,271 and December 29, 1989272
(Dziennik Ustaw Nr 75, December 31, 1989). Two less important
changes were introduced by the Statutes of March 28, 1990273 and of
April 11, 1990.274 While the role of the most important amendment
of April 1989, was to prepare the legal framework for the forthcoming
election through restructuring the main organs of state power, the
function of the other amendments was to purge the constitution of the
remnants of its Stalinist legacy.
The consolidated text dropped the word "People's" from the offi-
cial name of the state, which now is called "Polish Republic. ' 275 The
new law struck out the whole preamble which focused on "the liberat-
ing ideas of the Polish working masses; the historic victory of the
Union of Soviet Republic over Facism which liberated Polish soil; the
Polish working people's fight against the bitter resistance of the rem-
nants of the former capitalist-landlord system," etc. Poland ceased to
be described as "a socialist state ... implementing and developing a
socialist democracy.1 276 The term "socialist society" was substituted
with "citizens' society. ' 277 Chapter two on "Social and Economic
System" was deleted from the new constitutional text.
In the new constitutional scheme, Poland is described as "a dem-
ocratic legal state (state of law) that implements principles of social
justice. ' 278 Article 2 explains that "democratic" means that sover-
eignty "is vested in the Nation" which "exercises its power through
its representatives in the Seym, the Senate and the People's Councils."
It also means the introduction of elements of direct democracy in a
constitutionally guaranteed system of referendums. The "nation" be-
came the subject of power, replacing "the working people of town and
country." This notion corresponds to Polish doctrine, which views
the nation not as an ethnic but, rather, a political aggregate of all the
citizens.279
The concept of "legal state" or "state of law" is well known to
270. See Dziennik Ustaw (Official Gazette), Apr. 8, 1989.
271. See id. at Oct. 2, 1990.
272. See id. at Dec. 31, 1989.
273. See id at Mar. 19, 1990.
274. See Dziennik Ustaw (Official Gazette), at May 7, 1990.
275. POLISH CONST. (1990) (as amended), at art. 1, [hereinafter POLISH CONST.].
276. Id at arts. 1, 7.
277. Id. at art. 85.
278. Id at art. 1.
279. See Sokolewicz, Rzeczypospolita Polska - Demokratyczne Panstwo Prawne (Polish
Republic - A Democratic Legal State), 4 PANSTWO I PRAWO (State and Law) 19 (1990) [here-
inafter Sokolewicz].
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socialist theory, which views this idea as a relic of the widely criti-
cized legal normativism and positivitism. In Polish doctrine, the con-
cept of "legal state" involves a variety of principles such as: a duty of
strict observance of the law by every organ of State and every citizen;
the rule that all the organs of State authority and administration work
solely on the basis of and within the boundaries of the law; the princi-
ple of a hierarchy of the law with the constitution at the apex of the
legal system, followed by the statutes and sub-statutory acts; the hier-
archization of organs of state power and administration with the legis-
lature as a supreme power; a wide catalog of citizens rights; and an
extensive system of public control.
28 0
The meaning of "the principles of social justice," which the Po-
lish Republic is supposed to implement, is less clear. Polish commen-
tators explain that this pronouncement is a reflection of post-socialist
protectionism. The Polish Republic is no longer a socialist state, but
neither is it a market economy. The new Polish law eliminated the
privileges of state property and guarantees an equal protection to all
forms of ownership. In contrast to the new Hungarian constitution, it
does not describe Poland as a market economy. In the opinion of
Polish constitutional experts, an emphasis put on the "principles of
social justice" means that in the transitory period between non-mar-
ket and market economy, the Polish society needs a special protection
against the brutal mechanisms of a capitalistic competition.
28 1
Another important principle which was introduced into the Po-
lish Constitution in 1989, is political pluralism. The reform was the
result of a severe parliamentary struggle and intense social pressures.
On August 23, 1989, the fifteen members of the communist party
political club in the Seym moved to eliminate the words "the leading
role of the Communist Party" from article 3. The new article 4 states
that "political parties are organized on the basis of principles of vol-
untary and equal membership of the Polish citizens and in order to
influence in a democratic way the state's politics."
Despite numerous suggestions that the principle of division of
powers does not mean that the powers are equal and is recognized
also in parliamentary systems, the new amendments, regrettably, did
not enact this most commonly recognized constitutional rule.28 2 The
280. See Zawadzki, No wa Konstytucyjna Definicja Polskiej Panstwowosci (A New Consti-
tutional Definition of the Polish State), 5 PANSTWO I PRAWO 3-11 (1990) [hereinafter
Zawadzki].
281. Id. at 20; Sokolewicz, supra note 279, at 14.
282. A. Zawadzki spoke in favor of the principle of division of powers. See Zawadzki,
supra note 280, at 17-18. But see Sarnecki, Zalozenia Konstytncji (Fundamental Constitutional
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reluctance to adopt this principle seems to be a typical legacy of the
socialist theory of law, which for years argued that the division of
powers is incompatible with the principle of superiority of the legisla-
ture. For a long time it was argued incorrectly that in a typical parlia-
mentary system only the legislature is "an organ of a nation's power."
Although the principle that the "Seym is a supreme representative of
the will of the Nation, ' 283 has deep roots in the Polish constitutional
traditions, it is questionable whether the words "supreme organ" or
"superior representative" mean "exclusive representation." Simply,
the concept of superiority does not rule out the right of other organs
to exercise or share legitimate power on behalf of the Nation.
The new amendments provided for a bicameral legislature com-
posed of the Seym and the Senate.284 The Seym remained the
supreme legislative body, while the new Senate was given legislative
initiative and the right to review the legislation passed by the Seym.
Amendments introduced by the Senate could be overruled by a two-
thirds vote in the Seym with at least one half of all deputies present.
285
It was resolved that the Senate would participate on equal footing
with Seym in modifying and adopting the constitution and in the elec-
tion of the President of the Republic.
2 6
The constitutional amendments created the office of the Presi-
dent. The initial changes of April 8, 1989, provided that the President
would be elected for six years by the joint session of the National
Assembly. The amendment of September 27, 1990, shortened the ten-
ure of the President's office to five years and resolved that the Presi-
dent is elected directly by the Nation and can be reelected only
once.287 The President has legislative initiative and signs laws. His
refusal to sign a statute may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the
Seym in the presence of at least half of its members.288 The President
can also submit the statute to the Constitutional Tribunal for a review
of its constitutionality. 28 9 The president was given the power to pro-
claim martial law for a period of three months in the case of a serious
danger to the state or a natural catastrophe. He could dissolve the
Principles), 7 PANSTWO I PRAWO 15 (1990) [hereinafter Sarnecki]. See also Sokolewicz, Rzad
w Przyszlej Konstync/i (The Government in a Future Constitution), 7 PANSTWO I PRAWO 15
(July 1990) [hereinafter The Government in a Future Constitution].
283. POLISH CONST., supra note 275, at art. 20 § 2.
284. POLISH CONST. OF 1952, at ch. 3.
285. POLISH CONST., supra note 275, at art. 27.
286. Id at art. 32.
287. Dziennik Ustaw (Official Gazette).
288. POLISH CONST., supra note 275, at art. 27 § 5.
289. Id at § 4.
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Seym when the legislature is unable to establish a new government
within a period of three months, when the legislature fails to adopt a
budget or when the legislature takes steps which encroach on the
president's constitutional prerogatives. 290 The president is com-
mander-in-chief of the Polish army and presides over the Committee
of National Defense. He nominates the Prime Minister and can sub-
mit to the Seym a motion for his dismissal.291 The right to approve or
dismiss the government and the members of the Council of Ministers
is reserved to the Seym. 29 2 Executive acts of the President must be co-
signed by the Prime Minister. As head of state, the President is not
politically accountable to the Seym but is constitutionally accounta-
ble. He can be impeached for a violation of the constitution before
the Tribunal of State by a vote of all the members of the National
Assembly (the Seym and the Senate).
As the Polish model of administrative and constitutional judicial
review was well established by the Statutes on the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court of January 31, 1980, and on the Constitutional Tribunal
of April 29, 1985,293 the changes introduced by the amendments were
relatively minor. The new laws resolved that independence of the ju-
diciary was safeguarded by a National Judicial Council composed of
judges delegated by a General Assembly of the Supreme Court, the
High Administrative Court and District Courts.
The other institutional changes in the constitution terminated the
existence of the Council of State, the duties of which passed to the
President. The laws introduced an organ of Ombudsman, Rzecznik
Praw Obywatelskich, and eliminated the office of the Procurator Gen-
eral whose functions were taken over by the Minister of Justice.
To sum up, the Polish elections of 1989 were "free" in a specific
way. Some Polish observers noted that the pre-electoral accords did
not pluralize the Polish system. The roundtable accords did not guar-
antee the proportional representation to all or even major political
groups. They replaced the monopoly with a one-party bipolar system
in which the Communist bloc of parties was free to compete with
Solidarity for the seats in the Senate which were distributed in ad-
vance in the Seym. 294 The multi-seat electoral districts were main-
tained. Altogether, there were 108 electoral districts: nine two-seat
290. Id. at art. 30.
291. Id. at art. 24.
292. POLISH CONST., supra note 275, at art. 32.
293. Id. at art. 37.
294. See Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current Develop-
ments, 37 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 96, 100 (1988).
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districts (8.3%); twenty-seven three-seat districts (25%); thirty-four
four-seat districts (31.4%); and thirty-eight five-seat districts
(35.2%).295 In each district, one to three Solidarity candidates com-
peted with one to four candidates of the Party bloc. In fact, what
produced election results was not a political personality of candidates,
but the support of the two blocs, and in Solidarity's case, Walesa's
personal recommendation.
296
Constitutional reform was an important element in Solidarity's
strategy to take power from the communist party. The amendments
substantially changed the Stalinist profile of the Polish political sys-
tem but they still have a provisional character. 297 As W. Sokolewicz
wrote, "The April Constitutional amendments were not the realiza-
tion of a consciously planned long-term project of a constitutional re-
form and still they have to be melded in an entirely new
constitution. ,2
98
C. Hungary - Reform 'from within" and 'from without"
The post-war history of the Hungarian People's Republic does
not differ significantly from other countries of the Soviet bloc. The
Yalta conference in February 1945 recognized the Soviet "liberation"
of Hungary but called for a cooperation of the communists with other
non-communist parties. At the time of the adoption of the first com-
munist constitution in May 1949, this cooperation was already a fic-
tion and the communists controlled the government.
Matyas Rakosi, the leader of the Hungarian Worker's Party, in-
troduced a typical Stalinist program of industrialization and collectiv-
ization. The program was designed to create an economic
infrastructure which was recognized as necessary for the subsequent
creation of the mature communist superstructure: the political sys-
tem, education and collective mentality of the communist society.
Both the attempts to create a successful economic base and a collec-
tive mentality resulted in total failure. The role of the collective in the
formation of a socialist personality was severely crippled. Party prop-
295. See Gebethner, Wybory do Sejmn: Senatu 1989 (Elections to Seym and Senate in
1989), 4418 PANSTWO I PRAWO 4 (1989) [hereinafter Gebethner]. See also Kropownicki,
Liczyl sic Tylko Stepel Walesy (Everything with the Stamp of Walesa), 24 GAZATA
WYBORCZA 5 (June 9-11, 1989).
296. Gebethner, supra note 295, at 7.
297. Id. In the first round of elections, 62.32% of the electorate participated; in the sec-
ond round only 25.11% voted. Id at 12.
298. Sokolewicz, Kwietniowa Zmiana Konstytncji (April Constitutional Changes), 6
PANsrwo PRAwo 6 (June 1989) hereinafter April Constitutional Changes].
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aganda notwithstanding, the collective in any true sense posed a
threat to totalitarian control. The real aim of the collective, as it de-
veloped under Stalin, was not to bring people together, but to serve as
an instrument for the destruction of the individual approach to life
and to promote the complete atomization of society. The attempts to
collectivize the economy caused a widespread discontent and resulted
in the adoption of the so-called "New Course" in 1953.299 New Prime
Minister, Imre Nagy, put more emphasis on the economic sector by
producing consumer goods and discontinuing some of the projects
which were focused on the increase of the heavy industry potential of
the Hungarian economy. As a result of the power struggle between
Nagy and Rakosi, Nagy, the forerunner of the Hungarian "New
Deal," was ousted and Rakosi and his successor, Erno Gero, tried to
reintroduce a "proper" Stalinist course.
3
0
Stalin's death resulted in attempts to reassess the significance of
communism in the Soviet bloc. Thousands of political prisoners were
released from labor camps; they had enough time to realize that some
mechanisms of the system were obselete and needed rapid moderniza-
tion. "De-Stalinization," no matter how serious its concessions, un-
doubtedly stimulated widespread discussion over theory and practice
of communism. Stalin's death and Khrushchev's attack on the al-
leged "sanctities" of Stalinism deepened the process of the intellectual
disintegration of Marxism-Leninism and initiated the relatively long
stage of denunciation of the fallacies of communism. It started with
the revolt of East German workers in 1953, turbulance in Siberian
camps soon afterwards, and upheavals of Hungarian and Polish work-
ers three years later.
The demonstrations of the students in Budapest in 1956 pro-
voked a split in the Hungarian party. The conservative faction, sup-
porting Gero, called for a crackdown on the opposition; while the
reformist faction, supporting Nagy, demanded Hungary's withdrawal
from the Warsaw Pact and recognition of its neutral status.30 1 On
November 4, 1956, the Soviet tanks entered Budapest, and after sev-
eral weeks of bloody fighting, the pro-Soviet government of Janos
Kadar was installed. Imre Nagy was executed and Hungary re-
mained an obedient Soviet satellite. 30 2
Renee de Nevers wrote:






Following the revolution of 1956 the new party leader Janos Kadar
implemented a policy designed to heal the wounds inflicted by the
crushing of the revolt. He tolerated all but outright hostility to his
regime, using as his slogan, "He who is not against us is with us," and
launched an economic policy, which, by favoring consumer goods
over the development of heavy industry, paid more heed to domestic
needs than had the earlier Stalinist model. These steps gradually
gained the regime a measure of credibility with the population, who
recognized that the leadership was exploring the limits of Soviet pa-
tience with these cautious reforms. In time, Kadar's government
gained more popularity than any other in Eastern Europe. It also
came to be viewed in the West as being as legitimate and independent
as was consistent with membership of the socialist community; the
result was that it gained relatively favourable trade terms. 30 3
In the long run, Kadar's policy was only partially successful. On
the one hand, it calmed public dissatisfaction and through decentral-
izing measures gained some recognition and support from the West.
On the other hand, it decreased the integration of the Hungarian
economy with the highly centralized system of other Council of Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries.304 In the 1980s, the
Hungarian government deteriorated badly. 30 5 The foreign debt was
close to twenty billion dollars by 1989. It had the highest external
debt per capita in the Soviet bloc.3°6 There was a widespread convic-
tion in the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) that Kadar's
regime was blocking a thorough reform. The initiative for reform
came "from within" the communist party. It again called for adapta-
tion of the healthy core of the party to recent social and political
trends. On May 22, 1988, Karol Grosz, the representative member of
a moderate reformist group in the party, was appointed as General
Secretary of HSWP and he promised to sponsor a series of political
and economic reforms in Hungary.
The further split in the HSWP occurred over the issue of "social-
ist pluralism." The new party leaders nominated to the Politburo,
such as Imre Poszagy and Rezso Nyers, believed that further plural-
ization of the Hungarian political life was inevitable. The moderate
conservatives, led by Grosz, tried to hammer the steps toward a
multi-party system. Finally the Hungarian Parliament's new law,
303. R. de Nevers, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End of an Era, 249 ADEL-
PHI PAPERS 28-29 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter The End of an Era].
304. See K. DAWISHA, EASTERN EUROPE, GORBACHEV AND REFORM: THE GREAT
CHALLENGE 176 (1990) [hereinafter THE GREAT CHALLENGE].
305. The End of an Era, supra note 303.
306. THE GREAT CHALLENGE, supra note 304, at 177.
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adopted in January 1989, established a legal basis for the creation of
independent political parties. In February, the HSWP conference de-
cided to relinquish its constitutionally guaranteed position as "a lead-
ing and guiding force" of the Hungarian society. Indeed, on May 2,
1989, Hungary became the first socialist country to tear down its part
of the Iron Curtain by removing the barbed wire on its border with
Austria.307 In the fall of 1989, Hungary decided to honor its commit-
ments under the Helsinki Act, which proscribed forcible repatriation
of foreign citizens to their home countries. Further, the Hungarian
government allowed East Germans who were passing through Hun-
garian territory to emigrate to the West. 30 It accelerated the fall of
Communism in Eastern Germany.
At the Party Congress in October 1989, the Hungarian Socialist
Worker's Party was dissolved. A new party subsequently emerged
and was named the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). It was led by a
new Prime Minister, Miklos Nemeth, and such leaders as Reszo Ny-
ers and Imre Pozsagy. The opening of the political system accelerated
the mushrooming of opposition parties, at least forty of them emerg-
ing immediately in the Hungarian political arena. The strongest polit-
ical groups were: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of
Free Democrats, the Union of Young Democrats, the Independent
Smallholders' Party, the Social Democrats and the Greens. Some
HSWP members joined two small conservative groups: the Ferenc
Munich Society and the Janos Kadar Society (reportedly inactive in
early 1990).30
9
The issue of the presidential election caused a major collision be-
tween the opposition, which favored a presidential election following
free parliamentary elections, and the leadership of the HSP, which
opted for the idea of an early 'ad hoc' presidential election. The oppo-
sition view narrowly prevailed in the referendum and the election in
April of 1990 gave the victory to the Hungarian Democratic Forum,
which was joined in an alliance in the 386-member Parliament by the
Independent Smallholders Party. The isolated Alliance of Free Dem-
ocrats scored twenty-four percent of the vote and Hungarian Socialist
Party received only 8.3 percent. The Prime Ministry was turned over
to the leader of the Hungarian Forum, Josef Antall, and the initiative
in the process of political and economic transformation passed to the
non-communist bloc.
307. See Deane, After the Bloc Party, 14 WiLsoN Q. 48 (Spring 1990).
308. See The End of an Era, supra note 303, at 32-33.
309. THE GREAT CHALLENGE, supra note 304, at 298.
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Although the Hungarians did not adopt a new constitution,
amendments introduced in 1989 and 1990 to the Constitutional Act
XX of 1949 were the most thorough transformations in the Soviet
bloc. 310 According to the new constitutional text, Hungary changed
its official name from the Hungarian People's Republic to the Repub-
lic of Hungary. It is no longer described as a socialist state in which
all power belongs to the working people and their leading force, the
Marxist-Leninist party. Instead, the Republic is described as "a con-
stitutional state implementing a multi-party system, parliamentary
democracy and social market economy. 311
The constitutional amendments emphasize that the Republic of
Hungary draws from the achievements of both Western-type democ-
racy and traditions of democratic socialism. With the exception of
this introductory statement, the word "socialism" was carefully de-
leted from the entire constitutional text. The typical statements of the
socialist constitutions on "the process of building of socialism,1 312
"elimination of the exploiting classes, ' 313 and on "the dependence of
the rights of citizens on the interests of socialist society" 314 were to-
tally omitted in the new text.
The constitution no longer guarantees a privileged status to "all
forms of social ownership. ' 31 5 The amendments declare that "the
economy of Hungary is a market economy" and gives equal rights
and protection to forms of public and private ownership.316 The new
text recognizes within the constitutional limitations the expropriation
of property only for reasons of public interest, the right to free compe-
tition, and guarantees the right of inheritance. 31 7
The constitutional amendments did not change a form of the
state which is still described as a parliamentary democracy with the
parliament as "a supreme organ of state power and popular represen-
tation." The Parliament still has vast powers to elect the highest ex-
ecutive and judicial officials of the state such as the members of the
Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, the Commissioners of
310. A uniform structure of the Constitutional Act XX of 1949 and its amendments was
published in Magyar Kozlony (The Hungarian Official Gazette) Aug. 24, 1990. The English
version is quoted from the official translation of the constitutional text, which was sent to the
author by the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
311. HUNGARIAN CONST. OF 1949, preamble (former version).
312. Id. at art. 5.
313. Id. at art. 6.
314. Id. at art. 54.
315. HUNGARIAN CONST. OF 1949, at art 6 (former version).
316. 1& at art. 9 (amended text).
317. Id. at arts. 9, 13, 14.
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Citizens' Rights, the Presidents of State Audit Office, the National
Bank, the Supreme Court and the Chief Prosecutor. The term of the
Parliament, however, was shortened from five to four years and its
right to declare a state of war, and to pronounce states of exigency
and emergency was reserved to the decision of a qualified, two-thirds
majority. 318 In addition, the amendments imposed new checks on the
power of the Parliament through the elimination of the collegiate
head of state, the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic, and
the creation of the separate office of the President of the Republic.
The amendments also introduced the elements of direct or plebisci-
tary democracy by adding the provisions on a national referendum.
319
The introduction of the office of the President of the Republic
signifies an important step in the evolutionary process which may
change the socialist model of parliamentary democracy into the presi-
dential system. The amendments of 1989 and 1990 still seem to have
only a temporary character. After the numerous attempts to stipulate
that the president will be elected directly by the Hungarian people,
the current act declares that he is elected for four years by the Parlia-
ment with only one chance for re-election. The nomination for the
post of the president requires valid support of at least fifty members of
Parliament, with each member having the right to support only one
candidate.320 The election can take place in several rounds. In the
first two rounds, the President can be elected only by a qualified ma-
jority of two-thirds. In the third round, where only two candidates
remain, a plurality suffices for election. The president cannot be re-
called by the Parliament, but all measures taken by him must be
countersigned by one of the ministers, who are elected and dismissed
by the Parliament. The president is not fully independent. He is a
senior statesman and intermediary between the Parliament and the
prime minister. After consultation with the leaders of the Parliamen-
tary panels, the president gives the prime minister "the mandate to
form a Government. '" 321 However, the final approval of the govern-
mental program and the composition of the Council of Ministers is
vested in the Parliament. The president appoints and dismisses only
Parliamentary undersecretaries, the vice-presidents of the National
Banks and the university professors. The prpsident represents the
Hungarian state and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
322
318. Id at art. 19.
319. HUNGARIAN CONST. OF 1949, at art. 19 (amended text).
320. Id. at art. 29B.
321. Id. at art. 33.
322. Id. at art. 30A.
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The president can be impeached at the motion of one-fifth of all the
members of Parliament supported by the vote of two-thirds of the
members of the Parliament. The impeachment shall be considered by
a Council of Judgment composed of twelve persons elected by Parlia-
ment from among its members.
The president does not have a constitutional right to veto the
legislative acts. He can, however, ask the Parliament to reconsider
the Act and eventually submit it to the Constitutional Court for the
review of its constitutionality. If the act is not declared unconstitu-
tional by the court, the president must sign it within five days. The
president may dissolve the Parliament if it withdraws confidence from
the Council of Ministers at least four times within twelve months or is
unable to appoint the Council of Ministers. The provision that the
president can dismiss the Parliament only twice during his tenure was
dropped by the newest constitutional amendments.
The introduction of the new Constitutional Court, composed of
fifteen members elected by two-thirds of the Parliament and vested
with the right to annul unconstitutional laws, is another remarkable
change. However, despite the importance of the development of con-
stitutional review in Hungary, one has to observe that the constitu-
tional requirement of an apolitical character of the court is at least
unusual and unrealistic. It can be expected that the provision that the
members of the court should not be members of any political party
will have to be reconsidered and the rationale of this requirement sub-
mitted to a wider discussion.
The major changes were introduced into Chapter XII on the
Fundamental Rights and Duties. The economic rights that were put
in all Stalinist constitutions gave way to the declaration of human
rights to life and dignity, and the due process rights of citizens in the
criminal procedure that were omitted by the socialist constitutions.
The Hungarian Constitution now guarantees due process rights
against unlawful criminal prosecution: the right to liberty and per-
sonal safety, the right to compensation for victims of unlawful arrest
and detention, the presumption of innocence, the right to defense and
observance of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, which means that
no person shall be convicted and punished for an action that, at the
time of commission, did not qualify as a criminal offense under the
law. The list of civil rights and freedoms is also more impressive and
includes the right of thought, conscience and religion, expression of
opinions, liberty of press, the right to freely create organizations or
communities, and the right to strike. The constitution no longer
states that the exercise of rights is inseparable from the duties of citi-
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zens. It does, however, enumerate several basic duties in its conclud-
ing articles such as: the duty to defend the country, the duty to
contribute proportionally to income and property circumstances and
public expenditures, and the duty of parents to take care of the educa-
tion of their minor children.
In short, the Hungarian constitutional amendments, although
they still require some further refinement, created a solid framework
for further economic and social restructuring. The reform initiated
from within the party was undertaken by the non-communist ele-
ments and it continued without loss of momentum. Despite Hun-
gary's ethnic and social problems, its own grass-roots support in the
process of political restructuring and the flexibility of the competitive
political forces gained Hungary some credit in the West which facili-
tate the country's progress toward marketization and privatization.
V. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
FOR EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE
Is constitutional reform a major sign of restructuring the legal
system of former "People's Democracies"? Given a kaleidoscope of
political changes sweeping the Soviet Union, a definite answer may
hardly be rendered at this moment. With the Soviet empire dissolving
and crumbling rather than reconstituting, each change begets some
unpredictable change, and requires evaluation of upcoming events.
As far as it concerns the more advanced former Soviet satellite coun-
tries such as Poland or Hungary, a well-balanced assessment of the
constitutional changes in practice still requires time and numerous
constitutional adjustments. Thus, one should question whether this
situation allows a follow-up to the emerging constitutional model ap-
plicable to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. With all the
diversities of traditions, national problems and ethnic aspirations, this
task seems to be not only possible but necessary. Timothy G. Ash
wrote:
Of course there is a kaleidoscope of new parties, programs, and
trends, and it is little short of impudence to subsume them in one
'message.' Yet, if you look at what these diverse parties are really
saying about basic questions of politics, economics, law and interna-
tional relations, there is a remarkable underlying consensus. 323
323. Ash, Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BooKs,
Feb. 15, 1990, at 21.
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Based on these political changes, the following observations de-
serve notice:
1. A new constitutional model is surfacing although the process
is still far from completion. Until recently, no country within the for-
mer Soviet bloc adopted an entirely new constitution, although all of
them introduced remarkable changes into their basic laws and several
of them declared already that new constitutions are in process. The
Soviets still seem to have only a vague concept of political restructur-
ing and their economic reforms are losing momentum. However,
even they seem to comprehend at this moment that glasnost is a dis-
tress signal within their system. At the moment they conclude that
they do not need a "conservative revolution," but, rather, a radical
and thorough perestroika, they will have to draft a new constitu-
tion.324 The preamble of the amended Hungarian Constitution of
1949 states that the Parliament lays down the changes "until enact-
ment of a new Constitution." Bulgaria announced that a new consti-
tution will be adopted in 1991. As far as Poland is concerned, the
Constitutional Commission is already working on a project for a new
constitution, and its president declared that it will be submitted to the
Seym in early spring to be adopted on the bicentennial of the first
Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791.32 5
2. There is a strong tendency to emphasize that former commu-
nist states are in the process of transformation into liberal democra-
cies. It is quite clear that the new constitutions will describe their
countries not as "socialist democracies" but as parliamentary democ-
racies. It means that all the power in these states will not be vested in
the working classes as represented by their communist parties but in
"people" (like in Hungary) or in "nation" (like in Poland). The par-
liamentary character of these democracies means the same as in the
West: that the people exercise their sovereignty indirectly through
elected representatives. Representative or indirect forms of democ-
racy will prevail, although it already can be expected that the forms of
direct participation of people in power (through referenda or plebi-
scites) will be better developed in new constitutions.
Communism managed to poison numerous basic principles of
Western constitutionalism, particularly, the concept of division of
324. For comments on the idea of a "conservative revolution" see R. R. Ludwikowski,
Glasnost as a Conservative Revolution, INTERCOLLEGIATE REv., Fall 1989, at 25-32.
325. The most recent news from Poland indicates that the adoption of a new constitution
was postponed until the new parliament will be democratically elected in the Fall of 1991. The
current Seym was created in 1989 according to the deal which gave 60% of the legislative seats
to the coalition of the communist party.
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powers. The observer of the development of constitutionalism in
East-Central Europe has to admit that the reluctance to experiment
with the idea of checks and balances as practiced in the United States,
or even in a limited way in Western Europe, is widespread in the for-
mer socialist countries. The reservations to the concept of balance
and division of powers stem equally from the interwar parliamentary
experiences of Central European countries, the Polish legacy of
"seymocracy" and from the idea of socialist parliamentary superior-
ity, which did not function in practice, but was prevalent in socialist
constitutional theory. Upon taking all these factors into account, it
can be expected that forthcoming constitutional acts will favor parlia-
mentary forms of government, with elements of the presidential sys-
tem tested cautiously and introduced gradually through the system of
further amendments.
3. There is a tendency to describe the state as a "democratic
constitutional state" (such as Hungary) or a "democratic legal state"
(such as Poland). Both concepts put an emphasis on: a) the legality
(without the adjective "socialist") of state actions, b) the observance
of the law requiring every governmental organ to act on the basis of
law, c) the hierarchic character of legal acts with the basic laws recog-
nized as an apex of the legal system, d) the hierarchic character of
state organs subordinated to the supreme legislative bodies, and e)
extended protection for human rights.
4. The new constitutions will show no clear preference for a
bicameral or unicameral legislature. In the socialist legal theory of
law, the second chamber was recognized usually as unnecessary, with
the exception made only for countries with a federal system, like the
Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. As K. Grzybowski wrote, "Senate is
either anti-democratic or unnecessary. ' 326
The creation of the Senate in a unitary state such as Poland re-
sponded to the demand of revolutionary times and was expected to
create a framework for further pluralization of the political system.3 27
During the disputes of "the roundtable," it was reminded that some-
times the second chamber was conceived as an equivalent of "the
chamber of labor" and was expected to represent trade unions or self-
governmental institutions as in the Yugoslavian system. Some of the
Polish commentators argued for a more democratic electoral system
326. K. GRYZBOWSKI, SENAT ALBO NIEDEMOKRATYCZNY ALBO NIEPOTRZEBNY (Sen-
ate either antidemocratic or unnecessary) (1946); see also Jarosz, Problem drugiej iaby parla-
menti - Zarys Koncepcji (Problem with the second chamber of Parliament - Outline of the
Concept), 44 PANSTWO I PRAWO, 16-28 (Jan. 1989).
327. See April Constitutional Changes, supra note 298, at 3-19.
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in which one senator would be elected by one million electors and not
by the artificially created 100 electoral districts, two from each
voivodship. Some others argued that a weaker position of the Senate
in comparison with the Seym underminds the rationale of this institu-
tion. To sum up, one has to admit that the emergence of bicameral
legislative bodies in unitary states has to be reconsidered and that it
can be expected that in a new constitutional model there will be room
for the second chamber only as a federal component of the representa-
tive body.
5. The new constitutions will incorporate the principle of polit-
ical pluralism into the basic constitutional structures. One of the dis-
cernible trends in the new constitutions is the attempt to recognize a
multi-party system as an element of a well-functioning constitutional
government. The drafters of the constitutional amendments have al-
ready shown some sensitivity on this issue as well as concern that
some functions and public offices should be reserved only to people
who are politically neutral. Although it can be expected that the last
mentioned requirement will be dropped from the new basic laws, the
general tendency for guaranteeing constitutional protection for a
multi-party system will most likely prevail in the next round of consti-
tutional works in Central-Eastern Europe.
6. It is still not clear which electoral system will prevail in the
new constitutions. Poland traditionally favored the system of plural-
ity which recognized as elected those persons who received a majority
of the votes in their constituencies. The Electoral Law of April 7,
1989328 introduced two rounds of elections. The first round requires
more than fifty percent of votes for victory and in the second round a
plurality suffices. This system worked properly during the transitory
time when only two political blocs - Solidarity and the governmental
coalition, competed for power. With the further pluralization of Po-
lish political life, this system might require some adjustments. Under
the Hungarian election rules, nota bene one of the most complex in
the world, the plurality system was combined with a principle of pro-
portionality which fills nearly half the seats in the parliament on the
basis of votes cast for individual parties.3
29
The drafters of the new constitutions have to realize that the plu-
rality model was traditionally favored by the countries with a two-
party system; while the proportionality system prevailed in the multi-
328. Dziennik Ustaw, (Officiale Gazette), Nr. 19.f, Apr. 8, 1989.
329. Harden, Centrist Parties Surge in Hungarian Voting, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1990, at
Al & A20.
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party democracies. It can be expected that if the multi-party system
is going to prevail in a new constitutional model, it will have to be
linked to further introduction of proportionality into the electoral
laws of the countries of East-Central Europe.
330
7. There is a clear tendency to incorporate into the new consti-
tutional model some elements of the presidential system. The col-
legiate heads of state (Councils of State or Presidiums) were
eliminated and their functions passsed onto the executive. Although,
at this moment, there is a clear difference between the roles played by
executives in the new European democracies, it can be expected that
these posts will become a basic engine for further transformation in
this region. The role of presidents in the new democracies will inevi-
tably grow. Although it can be observed that Jaruzelski, the former
leader of the the Polish Communist Party, kept a relatively low proffle
as president, the Soviet or Czech presidents are clearly conductors of
domestic and foreign policies of their countries. It is almost certain
that Lech Walesa, elected Polish president in December of 1990, will
not be a figurehead.
At this moment, there are no indications that the new Eastern
European constitutional model will evolve toward the American pres-
idential system. The prevailing opinion is that the new models should
maintain a dual executive system, with presidents as heads of state
playing roles of "senior statesmen" or "supreme arbitrators" and the
prime ministers functioning as politically accountable chief executive
officers. 331 The observers believe that the new constitutional system
may evolve either toward a German type of "chancellor's democracy"
or a French presidential system. 332 In fact, an evolution toward either
the French or German models primarily depends on the political per-
sonalities of future presidents and prime ministers. Moreover, one
has to recognize that the presidential prerogatives in the Soviet
Union, Poland and Hungary are closer to the model worked out in
socialist Czechoslovakia, rather than to any of the West European
types.
The presidents currently in office (with the exception of Walesa)
were elected by the representative bodies. This system is going to un-
dergo a major change, and it can be expected that the successive bear-
330. See Zawadzki, supra note 280, at 19.
331. SOKOLEWicz, RZAD W PRZYSZLEJ KONSTYTUCJI 12-27.
332. Some commentators believe, however, that in Eastern Central Europe (especially in
Poland) there is no conducive political environment for the development of a "chancellor's
system." See SARNECKI, ZALOZENIA KONSTYTUCJi at 10.
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ers of the presidential offices will be elected directly by the people.333
The presidents will have a superior right of veto and a right to deny
their signature on legislative acts, which can be overruled by a quali-
fied majority of the parliaments. It can be expected that the right to
appoint ministers and other top officials will be turned over to the
presidents with the right to dismiss them reserved for parliaments.
The presidents will not be politically responsible but can be im-
peached by the parliaments for constitutional violations. They will be
commanders-in-chief of their militaries and will be vested with a pre-
rogative to impose martial law for a limited period of time in the case
of grave danger to the state or of natural catastrophe. In short, their
positions will, by no means, be ceremonial and it can be expected that
their prerogatives will grow.
8. As far as the economic system is concerned, the direction is
quite plain. The new constitutions will present the new democracies
as market economies although the market system may be described as
a "social one."' 334 "Social" will mean a widespread support for a still
large role played by the state in the relatively egalitarian distribution
of wealth.
9. It can be expected that the catalogs of fundamental rights in
the new constitutions will be relatively long and exhaustive. On the
one hand, the current constitutional lists of rights will be supple-
mented by important political and civil rights and due process rights
in criminal prosecution. However, on the other hand, the provisions
on economic, social and cultural rights will be moved behind the dec-
larations of political rights, although these rights will still receive con-
stitutional protection.
10. Last, but not least, enforcement mechanisms will be built
into the new constitutional texts. They will guarantee the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and will introduce a system of judicial review of
the constitutionality of legislative acts. It is predictable that the new
democracies will adopt a so-called "centralized" or Austrian model,
which reserves the right of constitutional review to one special judicial
organ. This system favors "abstract review" which is initiated before
the special court by special state organs or officials in special proceed-
333. See Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic On Establishing the Post of the
President of the USSR, Mar. 14, 1990, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Nr. 42/14 1990, at
22-23, 32, Ustawa o Zmianie Konstytucji Rzecaypospolotej Polskiej (The amendment to the
Constitution of the Polish Republic), Sept. 27, 1990, Dziennik Ustaw, Nr. 67, Oct. 2, 1990, at
933.
334. The preamble to the HUNGARIAN CONST. OF 1949 as amended in 1989 and 1990.
See also Zawadski, supra note 280, at 21.
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ings; constitutionality of the normative act is the principle matter be-
ing reviewed, independent of any case.
In sum, it seems important to note that the new East-Central
European model will be an embodiment of features commonly recog-
nized as essential for Western constitutionalism: parliamentary and
liberal democracy, limited government, an open society providing a
broad coverage for human rights, legality or the rule of law, enforce-
ment of constitutional principles, and guarantees for private owner-
ship of property and market mechanisms. Yet, how this model will
function is a question which remains open. Those who study the
mechanisms of constitutional engineering should bear in mind that
practice can depart considerably from the best constitutional theory.
The legacy of socialist constitutionalism makes this reflection espe-
cially fresh and instructive. Hence, the practical value of the new
constitutional model will be a function of many variables: the appli-
cability of Western constitutional ideas in a new post-totalitarian
political environment, their compatibility with socialist and pre-so-
cialist Eastern European traditions, and the social and political com-
promise embodied by the new constitutions. The durability of the
new constitutional model will depend both on the coherence of its
essential components and on the political culture of the people who
will apply constitutional principles in practice. The new constitu-
tional model will only be as good and as firm as the will of the people
to protect it and to observe its basic provisions. How mature this is
still remains to be seen.
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